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Kennan and Human Rights

Gordon A. Christenson

George Kennan,
Kennan, the distinguished historian, scholar, and elder statesman,
statesman,
recently has reconfirmed
reconfirmed and explained his initial assault against dangers
"legalistic-moralistic" approach to the United
United States
from what
what he saw as the "Iegalistic-moralistic"
policy.' Soon after taking leave from the foreign service and moving
foreign policy.l
of
to Princeton, Kennan delivered
delivered a series of lectures at the University of
1951. Forming the basis of his first book on diplomacy, the lecChicago in 1951.
the
tures concentrated on American
American diplomacy during the first fifty years of the
century. 2 Kennan drew extensively upon examples of the use of
.twentieth century.2
of
supposed idealistic purposes that concealed failure in dealing consciously or
or
realistically with the dilemmas of substance in the international relations of a
nation thrust into world power.
Surprised in pursuing the contrast between the lucid, realistic thinking
"bombast" of their later successors,
of early American
American statesmen and the "bombast"
Kennan found a form of utopianism in the rationale and rhetoric of foreign
II. He
He
policy which began after the Civil War and held sway until World War
War II.
of
described this style as "utopian in its expectations, legalistic in its concept of
and
methodology, moralistic in the demands
demands it seemed to place on others, and
self-righteous in the degree of high-mindedness
high-mindedness and rectitude it imputed to
3
ourselves." This style found expression in too much reliance upon arbitraourselves."3
tion treaties, world disarmament conferences, multilateral treaties outlawing
of world
and illusions
war such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact,
Pact, and
illusions about
about the
the hope
hope of
world
Press,
University of
of Chicago
Chicago Press,
1900-1950 (Chicago:
(Chicago: University
Diplomacy, 1900-1950
I. George Kennan,
1.
Kennan, American Diplomacy,
lie in
in something
policy formulation
to lie
fault of
of our
our past
1951), 93. "I
"1see
see the
the most
most serious
1951),93.
serious fault
past policy
formulation to
something
problems." Ibid.
Ibid. His
His
approach to
to international problems."
call the legalistic-moralistic
legalistic-moralistic approach
that I might call
that
notes a
extensive notes
came to assemble
assemble from
from extensive
how he came
memoirs explain how
a polemic
polemic against
against
memoirs
in
presumably completed
completed itit in
remained unfinished
unfinished until
until he
in foreign
foreign policy,
morality
morality in
policy, which
which remained
he presumably
Brown, 1967),
1967),
1950-1963 (Boston:
(Boston: Little
Little Brown,
Kennan, Memoirs
Memoirs 1950-1963
his recent
recent article.
article. George
George Kennan,
his
Affairs 64
(1985): 205.
205.
Foreign Policy,"
Foreign Affairs
Kennan, "Morality
"Morality and
and Foreign
71-72; George
George Kennan,
Policy," Foreign
64 (1985):
note 11 above,
above, 95-103.
95-103.
American Diplomacy,
Diplomacy, note
2.
Kennan, American
2. Kennan,
above, 71.
71.
1950-1963, note
note 1I above,
3.
Memoirs 1950-1963,
3. Kennan,
Kennan, Memoirs

345

HeinOnline -- 8 Hum. Rts. Q. 345 1986

346

CHRISTENSON
CHRISTENSON

peace through
through international organizations such as the League of Nations
Nations and
and
the United
United Nations. These pretentions
pretentions and
and assertions of idealistic
idealistic purposes,
Kennan thought,
of substance in those efforts and
and
thought, concealed
concealed a failure of
reflected immaturity
immaturity in
in those responsible for the foreign policy of the
the
4
period. 4
In Kennan's view, the
the responsibility of governments
governments in foreign policy is
to act from
from a realistic appraisal of the "national
"national interest."
interest." The difficulty of this
kind of
is illustrated by the skepticism of
of calculation is
of David
David Hume, who
who explained that while it is in the interest of nations to have
have laws of nations and
and
an obligation for all to obey them,
them, it is not necessarily in the interest of a
is in the interests of every nation is that
single nation
nation to obey them.
them. "What
"What is
Hume's utilitarian
utilitarian premise,
other nations
nations obey them,
them, while it does not."
not."55 Hume's
dilemma in calculating the
while not free from criticism, illustrates Kennan's
Kennan's dilemma
the
national interest
interest as if itit were
were in contrast with "moralistic-legalistic"
"moralistic-legalistic" thinking.
That Hume's (and possibly Kennan's) premise
premise may not be valid can be
shown
shown at the outset from the imperatives Kennan
Kennan himself addresses.
Two
Two great
great perils, nuclear weapons
weapons and destructive changes in the global
ecology (a
(a third may involve the global economy), require an international
regime of cooperation
cooperation transcending
transcending the interests of any single nation-state,
according to Kennan.
Kennan. A moral imperative drives or ought to drive the United
United
States to address these problems. The reason is that the threat
threat is
is common to
all and jeopardizes the survival of all, requiring cooperation even if national
hand, Kennan
sovereignty has to yield to the common interest. On the other hand,
does not believe that the same moral
moral obligation for governments follows
follows
especially
from the concern for individual human rights in other countries, especially
when it means intruding in the legal and political relationships between
another country and its nationals or residents.
In a system of nation-states each having autonomous soverign power,
the structure necessary for the effective resolution of the twin perils requires
international control or regulation that intrudes into the power of any single
state. Why does Kennan make the case for intrusive international control to
reduce the grave dangers from nuclear and environmental threats, but
but
of
choose not to make it for the threats to civilization by the brutalization of
human beings by some of those governments?
Understanding
Understanding the formulation
formulation of this interpretation and the intellectual
basis for Kennan's critique and distinctions reveals the implications of his
realism for aa jurisprudence of international human rights. 66 Such an inquiry
4. Ibid., 71.
71.
Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 233.
5.
5. Jonathan Harrison, Hume's Theory of Justice
seems to share Kennan's realism in addressing human rights morality from
6. Richard Falk seems
national perspectives: "[I]t
"[l]t is as revealing as it is disquieting to note that the international
concern of governments for human rights, realized after it became a goal of American
American
was
foreign policy at the outset of the Carter presidency, has receded as quickly as it was
of
stimulated, here and elsewhere."
elsewhere." Falk is doubtful whether the contemporary structures of

HeinOnline -- 8 Hum. Rts. Q. 346 1986

Kennan and Human Rights

347

also requires self-recognition.
self-recognition. In Kennan's
Kennan's view, limits within the human
human predicament ought to restrain a foreign policy of "moralistic meddling."
meddling." Like
is not driven by the moral
Butterfield, Kennan is
moral vision of the City of God or its
it. 7
transformed into
world be
utopian secular equivalents to insist that the world
be transformed
into it.?
What statesmen wisely can do with the worldly city does not and ought not
depend on the heavenly or utopian vision. St. Augustine thought a Christian
conception of the City of God does not and ought not require that a statesCoil interprets St.
man impose that vision on the world. As Alberto Coli
Augustine's
Augustine's view, dealings among noble pagans in service of the state and
and
informed by human experience and worldly calculations, even if held to the
possibility of original sin,
sin, would ultimately do less harm and less violence
imposed. 8B
brutally imposed.
than if a utopian city were brutally
For Kennan, understanding human conditions realistically, choosing
harm, and
and
policy prudently, and acting wisely might avoid disaster, or great harm,
yet lead to unpleasant consequences. He thought the national interest required intervention in Korea to contain aggression from the north and avert
He
or deter further propensities for expansion by other aggressive nations. He
MacArthur to push beyond the status quo ante
also thought it imprudent
imprudent of MacArthur
toward the Yalu River, inviting greater
greater disaster by upsetting the Chinese. The
lives sacrificed, the unpleasant human consequences of the war, were worth
lives
the cost only to a point, Kennan thought. How does aa government, in its
foreign policy,
policy, handle these kinds of moral
of
moral dilemmas? Knowing
Knowing the limits of
the human condition is
is a beginning. As Kennan explained to the student left
during
during another, more difficult, dilemma
dilemma involving the Viet Nam
Nam war, a deepened sadness about suffering might replace anger. An acute sense of the
tragic in the human condition might temper brutality. Humor
Humor and grace in
power, global and national, can tap the humanizing
humanizing potential of human rights norms.
norms.
(New
Richard Falk,
Falk, The End of World Order: Essays on Normative International Relations (New
& Meier, 1983),
1983), 29-30. Thus he shares Kennan's
Kennan's skepticism about the
York: Holmes &
claims of human rights diplomacy but for widely divergent reasons. Falk believes that
such advocacy merely reinforces the nation-state
nation·state system that allows nationalistic goals to
be pursued in their territories so long as they will abide by the most minimal decencies required by international law. Until structural transformation allows human rights to
become part of a new Grotian global synthesis, the "faddish prominence
prominence temporarily accorded human rights diplomacy as a pathetic reenactment of the Grotian
Grotian quest"
quest" will be
"statist logic." Ibid.
overcome by
by"statist
Kennan agrees but proposes to work within the traditional statist system to achieve
"reasonably conconprecisely what realistically can be achieved in the national interest, "reasonably
ceived," with human rights in other countries being of lesser concern. Curiously, they
both agree that two of the most overriding global concerns that nations now face are
nuclear weapons, including the problem of major war, and the massive abuse of the ecological planetary system. These problems are relatively new and require global cooperation as a matter
matter of national self-interest. Kennan,
Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy," note 1
above, 216-217.
7. Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of History, ed. Adam
Adam West (London: Eyre Muthaen,
1981), 181.
181.
8. 5ee
See Alberto CoIl,
of..
Butterfield and the Philosophy of
Coli, The Wisdom of Statecraft: Sir Herbert Butterfield
International Politics (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1985),27-28.
1985), 27-28.
Internationa(Politics
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living without illusion become ways to remain active in the harsh world,
without giving up, even in the face of the consequences of our actions,
refusing the self-righteous vision as justification for ignoring the harm we
may cause to our institutions by destructive protest. 99
Though inadequately stated above, this orientation of Kennan to the
world, to his thesis and to his self-knowledge, shapes the inquiry. This essay
essay
seeks understanding of his view of normative
normative thinking in foreign policy,
whether moral or legal, and the implications from the perspective of human
rights in an unfriendly world.
world. It criticizes his conceptual presuppositions to
gain clarity, posing paradoxes and dilemmas regarding their normative qualquality within the present structure of international relations.

CRITICAL-REALIST VIEW OF LAW AND MORALITY
I. THE CRITICAL-REALIST
"legalistic-moralistic" approach to
Kennan penned that felicitous phrase, the "legalistic-moralistic"
an
foreign policy, in his last lecture at Chicago. Hans Morgenthau,
Morgenthau, himself an
accomplished
accomplished international
international lawyer, had earlier laid the intellectual foundations in his unrelenting attack on the legalistic-moralistic approach to inter10
From the time Kennan made the term
term popular, it has
national relations. 10
become widely known and often misunderstood. The phrase for decades
has been the foil against which international legal scholars in particular have
policy."
launched a major defense of the role of international law in foreign policy.ll
The critical realists identified with Kennan and Morgenthau
Morgenthau differ from
the pure "scientific" normativists associated with the theory of Hans
12 While both the realists and the normativists distinguish political
Kelsen. 12
from moral
moral or legal imperatives, they differ in their view of law and morality.
For Kelsen,
moralKelsen, the pure norm of law differs conceptually from subjective morality. For the political realists, both law and morality, at least in the international arena, are subjectively normative. Most post-war American legal
and
9. See in particular Kennan's
Kennan's plea to the student left during the late 1960s, in Democracy
Democracy and
1968), 216, 227.
Brown & Co.,
Co., 1968),
the Student Left (Boston: Little, Brown
J. Morgenthau,
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973),
10. Hans J.
4-15; Hans J.
J. Morgenthau,
Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1951),
1951), 144 ("legal
("legal obligations must yield to the national interest").
interest'l.
11. See, for example, Richard Falk, Legal Order in a Violent World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
11.
1968), 257; Richard Falk, The Status of Law in International Society
University Press, 1968),
Society
1970), 497; and John Moore, "Law
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970),497;
"Law and NaNa·
tional Security," Foreign Affairs
Affairs 51 (1973): 408. "On one side were international relations
theorists such as Hans J.
J. Morgenthau and George
George F.
F. Kennan, who saw only a small role
for international law and who opposed their 'realist'
'realist' position to what they believed were
dangers of aa 'legalistic-moralistic'
'legalistic-moralistic' approach
approach in dealing with national security issues. On
the other side were jurists such as Hardy C. Dillard and Myres S.
S. McDougal,
McDougal, who warned
that the realists had an incomplete understanding of the role of international law and that
their view, if influential, could be costly for American
American foreign policy." Ibid.
12.
& Co., 1952),
380-386.
1952),380-386.
12. Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New York: Rinehart &
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remained centrist
centrist and Grotian,
Grotian, allowing
allowing moral
moral reasoning to
to ininscholars have remained
fluence
fluence the structure
structure of international
international law
law but
but relying on
on positive state prac13
They
what particular
particular norms
norms exist
exist objectively.
objectively.13
They have actice for evidence
evidence of what
tice
the realist criticism
criticism 14
14 but have claimed
claimed a longer
longer tradition of
of law
law as a
cepted the
5
limitation or guide
guide to action
action based upon
upon custom and
and consent.'
consent. 15
The Kennan-Morgenthau
Kennan-Morgenthau school of realism in power
power politics has been
been
criticized both as contrary to the rule of law and as condoning naked power
power
the national interest.1
interest. 166 Kennan's lonely voice was heard
in the service of the
often
often from his isolation from
from and disagreement
disagreement with much
much of the making and
expression of foreign policy then
then under way after
after World
World War
War II. He called
hard analysis of particular interests quite apart
apart from
from moral
moral posturing made
made
for hard
not
into universal
universal doctrines for domestic political consumption. He was not
averse to American intervention,
intervention, for example, for
for the protection of specific
specific
vital interests,
Korean war to repel the
the attack to the 38th Parallel
interests, as in the Korean
(but not
not to the Yalu).
Yalu). He
He would first require, however, aa rigorous and precise
understanding
for
understanding of national interests. His most biting criticism was saved for
the American
American penchant for trying to conform behavior of others
others in the world
world
drawn from a projected idealistic legal vision. The exto a set of universals drawn
Spanish-American war,
amples he used in the Chicago lectures covered the Spanish-American
Europeans,
the Open
Open Door policy for China with Hays scolding the wicked Europeans,
(seeking "victory"
the two world wars and the Korean conflict (seeking
"victory" over all Korea)
and the events leading to it. Kennan severely challenged this belief structure.
flowering at
the
While it seems
seems quaint to us now, philosophical idealism flowering
at the

The British
British Year13. See Hersch Lauterpacht, "The
"The Grotian Tradition in International Law,"
Law," The
book of International
InternationalLaw 23 (1946): 1.
of
S. Carlston.
Carlston. Falk, The Status of
14. See Falk's conclusion in his review of the work of Kenneth S.
Law in International Society, note 11 above, 497.
drawn from
15. Positive international law is traditionally determined by reference to evidence drawn
state practice, treaties, decisions of international tribunals, general principles of law common to all nations, and opinio juris from respected publicists.
Representative American international legal scholars holding this view in separating
positive international law from both morality and politics are identified in Francis Boyle,
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1985), 3-57.
World Politics and International Law
Law (Durham,
For an earlier statement of the English influence, see Lassa Francis Lawrence
Lawrence Oppenheim,
Journal of InternaInternaInternational Law: Its Task and Method," American
"The Science of International
American Journal
"The
Concise
tional Law 2 (1908): 313. Later British positivism is found in Arthur
Arthur Nussbaum,
Nussbaum, Concise
of
L. A. Hart, The Concept of
History of the Law of Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1954); H.
H. L.
Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 221 (distinguishing international law from
(Oxford:
morality); and Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford:
distinction
1979). Hans Kelsen propounds the clearest conceptual distinction
Clarendon Press, 1979).
among these in Principles of International Law note 12 above. See also Wolfgang FriedFried1967), 579; Wolfgang
Wolfgang
mann, Legal Theory, 5th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967),579;
Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (New York: Columbia University
Friedmann,
1964).
Press, 1964).
16. See critical comments
comments from students and academics, together with Kennan's response, in
in
thinks
McDougal, no stranger to the power process, thinks
Kennan, note 9 above. Even Myres McDougal,
that political realism made fundamental errors in its lack of comprehensiveness or underabove.
See Falk,
Falk, note
note 11 above.
from community expectations. See
standing of authority from
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ime, as symbolized by Josiah Royce at Harvard,
Harvard, was a pervasive influence
tnd
md was easily associated with utopian legal thinking. It was easy to con;truct and destroy such an association, given the emerging American pragnatism championed by Royce's colleague and rival, William
WiJ)iam James.
vorgenthau
v10rgenthau and Kennan obliged.
The dangerous propensities of governments cannot be restrained by a
;ystem of legal rules and limitations in the same way they can be domestidomesti-ally where the aggressive instincts of individuals are repressed directly,
:ally
different
<ennan thought.'
thoughtY7 What was possible for thirteen colonies in a different
jeriod, moreover, might not be possible for nations.
nations.'188 A naive belief in the
Jeriod,
the
•ule of
law among
nations, if
if acted
on, meant
meant in
in his estimation that
of law
among nations,
acted on,
'ule
conflicts
;tatesmen might and most often would avoid facing the intractable conflicts
nn interests of nations by finding some formal criteria to define the permissiile
Jle behavior of states juridically. This avoidance operated to conceal the
the
zonflicts
conflicts by placing the burden and function of determining outcomes on
'ormal
formal rules or process. Competent judicial bodies or international organiza:ions and good offices would measure governmental
governmental behavior against those
:riteria and decide whether or not that conduct was acceptable. The objeccriteria
:ive and impartial application of autonomous rules idealistically agreed to
tive
and codified in positive law under the Hague Conventions
Conventions and others would
hostility.
narrow conflict and reduce hostility.
The assumption would have to be made, as Kennan
Kennan pointed out, that
Dther peoples would want to subordinate their own positive aspirations or
other
ambitions and demands to this abstract and idealistic code of treaty law or
custom
proper
custom for the pacific settlement of international disputes. With proper
submissiveness the destructive manifestations of national ego and aggressiveness might be contained or composed by making conflict narrowly less
substantial.'
substantial. 199 Kennan thought there lay behind this innocence aa classic
17. In
In this conclusion, Kennan agreed with Freud, who in Civilization and its Discontents,
17.
trans. Joan Riviere (New York: J.
& H.
H. Smith, 1930) began to explore the collective
J. Cape &
social pathologies
pathologies and
to speculate
speculate on
the taming
of the
the destructive
instincts through
insocial
and to
on the
taming of
destructive instincts
through interpersonal and family
family psychological
psychological arrangements.
terpersonal
arrangements.
18. But see the precise question put in the Constitutional
Constitutional Convention by Patterson of New
New
Jersey, as chronicled by Samuel
Samuel Eliot Morison,
Morison, The Oxford History of
of the American People
(New York:
1965), 308. The proposal on sanctions if a state ig(New
York: Oxford
Oxford University Press, 1965),308.
nored or
or failed
to enforce
an Act
Act of
that the
the Executive
should have
have power
power
nored
failed to
enforce an
of Congress
Congress was
was that
Executive should
"to
the power
power of
of the Confederate States
States...
to enforce and compel an obedi"to call forth the
... to
ence." Hamilton
and Madison
Madison objected for
for reasons still
still compelling in
in international
international relarelaence."
Hamilton and
tions: "The
"The larger states will be impregnable, the smaller only can feel the vengeance of
It was
was the cobweb
cobweb which would
would entangle the weak, but
but would be
be the sport of
of the
the
it....
..•. It
proposal "coercion by
by force." The Convention
Convention rejected it by
strong." Ellsworth
Ellsworth called the proposal
strong."
by
substituting "coercion by
by law"
law" whereby
whereby the
the national
national power
power would be
be applied
applied directly to
substituting
individuals by
by judges
judges under
supermacy clause,
clause, differing
from earlier
federal governindividuals
under the
the supermacy
differing from
earlier federal
governments by
by affording
operation" on
on the
the individual
ments
affording "complete
"complete and
and compulsive
compulsive operation"
individual citizen.
19. Roscoe
Roscoe Pound
Pound frequently
used the
the term
"composition" to
the termination
frequently used
term "composition"
to mean
mean the
termination of
of aa
19.
dispute by
by an
adjustment that
might reduce
fighting and
buying off
off
an adjustment
that might
reduce fighting
and increase
increase security
security by
by buying
dispute
vengeance
with compensation,
thereby trivializing
trivializing the
conflict. Roscoe
Pound, IntroducIntroducvengeance with
compensation, thereby
the conflict.
Roscoe Pound,
tion to the Philosophy of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1922), 74-75, 136.
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American
American avoidance, the
the denial
denial that
that other
other peoples have
have interests or
or aspirations more
more important
important than
than the uniquely
uniquely American,
American, possibly Wilsonian, vision of
of world
world peace. ItIt is
is implausible
implausible to the American
American mind,
mind, according
according to
Kennan,
that
other
people
should
have
objectives
and
a
vision
of
order
order more
more
Kennan,
should
and
dream
of
international
peace
important
to
them
than
the
American
important to
than
American dream of international peace and har20
mony.20
mony.
American
American statesmanship, influenced in
in large part
part by
by the legal profesprofession, is driven by these biases to seek structures
structures for composing international
21
disputes by agreed
agreed criteria called rules
rules that
that embody
embody the
the universal
universal ideal.
ideal. 21
This structural
is an American style that
structural approach
approach to international disputes is
that
defers
defers substantive
substantive conflict to aa later institutionalized process using abstract
abstract
22
to accept.
doctrine that all appear to
accept.22
In addition to being misguided
misguided at home,
home, Kennan
Kennan believes this American
American
23 His most
view of world peace
peace fuels resentment
resentment and hostility elsewhere.
elsewhere.23
most rerecent piece in Foreign Affairs, "Morality
"Morality and Foreign Policy," explains why
why
worldly national interests, reasonably conceived, not moral judgments
about the goodness or wickedness of behavior
behavior of other nations, ought to be
the guiding principle in the making
He
making and execution of foreign policy. He
writes in the Butterfield tradition:
tradition:
It would be a policy that would seek the possibilities for service to morality
morality
It would restrictour
restrict our
primarily in our own behavior, not in our judgment of others. Itwould
undertakings to the limits
limits established
established by
by our
our own
It
own traditions and resources. It
undertakings
would see
see virtue in our minding
minding our
our own business wherever
not some
wherever there
the're is
is not
some
overwhelming
minding the business of others. Priority would be given,
overwhelming reason for minding
averting of the
two apocalyptic cahere, not to the reforming of others but to the averting
24
the horizons
hover over
now hover
that now
tastrophes that
over the
horizons of
of mankind.
mankind. 24
In this separation of morality from realistic national interests, Kennan
has long associated the legal with the moral.
moral. He does not distinguish international law from morality in his critique. It is unclear whether Kennan would
tionallaw
make such a distinction if he thought about it, and thus merely describes an
an
association others make, or if he would agree with others that the two cannot be separated.
separated. In either case he would see that this association contains
dangers. By linking moralistic with legalistic thinking, a foreign policy sets in
in
motion a propensity to carry into the affairs of states notions of right and
and
20. Kennan, American
American Diplomacy, note 1 above, 94.
21. Seven ofthe
of the eight U.s.
U.S. Secretaries of State from 1898 to 1920 were lawyers, among whom
21.
Day, John Hay, Elihu
Elihu Root, William Jennings Bryan,
Bryan,
were John Sherman, William Rufus Day,
Undersecretaries or
or legal
legal advisers
advisers included James Brown
Brown Scott, J.
and Robert Lansing.
lansing. Undersecretaries
J.
22.

23.
24.
24.

Reuben Clark, Jr., and John Bassett Moore, all influential on both positive international
international
law and foreign policy.
In present jargon, no structural approach is possible without dealing
dealing at some point
point with
systems of order, as Marx sought
the hidden preferences entailed in the deep structures of systems
to understand.
A recent
recent account and appraisal of the Reagan doctrine may be found in Stephen S.
S.
Rosenfeld,
"The Guns
Guns of July,"
July," Foreign Affairs
Rosenfeld, "The
Affairs 64 (1986): 698.
Kennan, "Morality
"Morality and
and Foreign
Foreign Policy,"
Policy," note
note 11 above, 217-218.
Kennan,
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wrong, "the
"the assumption that state behavior is
is a fit subject for moral judgment."2S
ment." 2 This conclusion flows from a different kind of prior morality, the
moral obligation to obey the law. Those who invoke a law thus might feel
moral superiority to the lawbreaker.
Kennan's
Kennan's view of domestic law clearly rests on a moral obligation to
26
When apobey the law if one is accepting its protection and advantage. 26
plied to state behavior inappropriately, as Americans
Americans often do, such moral
moral
indignation over another
another country's illegal actions can easily spill over into
27
legal sanctions, or military contest.
contestF
Now backed by military force, the
claim "knows no bounds short of the reduction of the lawbreaker to the
submissiveness- namely, unconditional surrender."
surrender." Milipoint of complete submissivenesstary coercion in the name of right easily leads to some form of domination,
domination, a
paradox for international law. While rooted in a hope for doing away with
"makes violence
war and violence, the legalistic approach to world affairs "makes
more enduring and destructive to political stability than did the older
interest." 28 Far greater
motives of national interest."28
greater in moral
moral virtue would be a United
States that maintained integrity and consistency in its own domestic morality
narrowly fashand in its calculation of foreign policy from interests more narrowly
fashwell-being.2299
national well-being.
and national
ioned from national security and
Whatever the intellectual validity of Kennan's own appraisal of the role
of law in international relations and its connection, if any, to morality, his
30 It rests on exposition has been consistent and coherent over the years.30
plicit assumptions that partake of a rich Western intellectual tradition, from
St. Augustine to Machiavelli and, beyond, to the political realists such as But25.
Diplomacy, note 1 above, 98.
25. Kennan, American
American Diplomacy,
26. Kennan,
Kennan, note
note 99 above,
above, 167-170.
167-170. "The
"The central
central function of government, as
as II see it, is
is the
assurance
the public
public order.
order. This
is something
something for
which nobody
nobody has
has ever
of the
This is
for which
ever found
found any
any
assurance of
suitable means
that do not
not include, at some point, the devices of coercion. This is
of
is true of
means that
the democracy as it is
is of the dictatorship. Whoever
Whoever relies on these devices - on the police
and
and the
the prisons-as
prisons-as instruments
the assurance of his
his own protection
instruments for the
and the
the courts
courts and
and his own enjoyment of civil
civil rights - has no moral basis, as I see it, for denying his contribution to their maintenance."
maintenance." Ibid., 169.
For example, the
the Reagan military response of April 1986 against Libya for exporting
27. For
revolutionary violence was justified
justified on the basis of self-defense.
self-defense_
Kennan, American
American Diplomacy,
28. Kennan,
note 11 above,
above, 98-99.
98-99. For
For aa recent
recent expression
expression of the pro28.
Diplomacy, note
to convert
convert a
moral position
pensity
position in
in foreign
policy into
a compulsion
compulsion to
prevail, see
see
pensity to
a moral
foreign policy
into a
to prevail,
Rosenfeld, note 23 above,
above, 713:
713: "Moral
"Moral considerations and the political pressures they
Rosenfeld,
generate will
keep pushing
pushing the
and trying
trying to
to win"
the lowlowgenerate
will keep
the President
President toward
toward escalating
escalating and
win" (in
(in the
cost
support of
of anti-communist
Nicaragua, Afghanistan,
Afghanistan, Cambodia,
Cambodia, and
and
anti-communist insurgencies
insurgencies in
in Nicaragua,
cost support
Angola).
Angola).
29.
Tonelson, "The
"The Real
National Interest,"
Policy 61
61 (1985-86):
(1985-86): 49;
29. Alan
Alan Tonelson,
Real National
Interest," Foreign
Foreign Policy
49; Christopher
Christopher
Layne, "The
"The Real
Conservative Agenda,"
Foreign Policy
61 (1985-86);
(1985-86): 73.
73. Layne rejects
Real Conservative
Agenda," Foreign
Policy 61
Layne,
both
ideological internationalism,
realist
both universalism
universalism and
and crusading
crusading ideological
internationalism, while
while supporting
supporting the
the realist
tradition
of Robert
Dwight Eisenhower,
and George
Kennan in
in resisting
promotradition of
Robert Taft,
Taft, Dwight
Eisenhower, and
George Kennan
resisting the
the promotion
of human
human rights
of international
international organizations
organizations as
major elements
rights and
and support
support of
as major
elements of
of U.S.
u.s.
tion of
foreign policy.
30. Serious
criticism continues.
For criticism
positive international
international law
law perspective,
perspective, see
see
30.
Serious criticism
continues. For
criticism from
from aa positive
Boyle, note
note 15
Boyle,
15 above,
above, 3-57.
3-57.
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terfield and
and Morgenthau.
Morgenthau. Especially
Especially now
now that
that Kennan's
Kennan's warning
warning isis heard
heard
terfield
of international
international law
law in
in foreign
foreign policy
policy seems
seems in
in
once again,
again, when
when the
the place
place of
once
decline in
in influence
influence and
and respect
respect in
in recent
recent years,
years, a clearer
clearer look
look at
at aa few
few cencendecline
31
tral
seems urgent.
urgent. 31
tral ideas
ideas seems

HUMAN RIGHTS
RIGHTS LAW
LAW AND
AND MORALITY
MORALITY
II. HUMAN
George Kennan
Kennan never
never has
has developed
developed explicitly aa studied
studied position
position on
on the
the use
use
George
of human
human rights
rights norms
norms in
in foreign
foreign policy. His writings
writings are
are replete,
replete, however,
however,
of
with specific
specific conclusions and
and examples
examples warning
warning against
against projecting domestic
domestic
with
of a morality
morality that
that seems
seems to underpin
underpin much
much of
of the
the human
human rights
conceptions of
conceptions
movement. Sometimes
Sometimes he
he refers to
to human
human rights documents
documents and
and the Helmovement.
32 His
ACt.32
His analysis based
based on national interests'
interests' predominating
predominating
sinki Final Act.
morality or legality repeats his
his Chicago
Chicago lectures'
lectures' theme.
theme. Human
Human rights interinteror interferences by one
one state in the domestic affairs of another
another are
are
ventions or
based on a displaced universalism
universalism encroaching
encroaching into
into the
the relations of governgovernown nationals.
ments with
with their own
The international
international human
human rights movement, which Kennan applauds
The
when private, has increased its pressure on government
government policy. This fact,
Kennan agrees, has to be considered in foreign policy decisions, but only
only
because public opinion requires attention for domestic political consumption and not because the nation has any obligation to act according to a
33
Nowhere, to my knowledge,
moral code in relation to other governments. 33
interest to use human
in
the
national
be
does Kennan ask whether it may
rights initiatives as an instrument of foreign policy in more sophisticated
ways to help aa people find a more humane alternative than repressive government from either the left or the right and thereby avoid the kind of polarrepudiated his intellectual position separating political realism
31. While Kennan has not repudiated
31.
did before his death, he has
Hans Morgenthau arguably did
and morality, as Hans
from legality and
an approach of
come close
close to adopting a utopian plea in preventing nuclear war based on an
as
law and organization model. The Morgenthau story as
self·interest
self-interest using the international law
"legalisticof the
the "Iegalisticthe realists' metaphysical construction of
criticism of the
well as aa rigorous criticism
above, 70.
note 15
15 above,
appears in Boyle, note
then deconstruct
deconstruct appears
moralistic" approach they then
moralistic"
1977), 154,
154, 212-214;
Little Brown, 1977),
The Cloud
Cloud of Danger (Boston: little
George Kennan, The
32. George
"Morality and Foreign Policy," note 11 above.
Kennan, "Morality
Kennan,
policy
to foreign
foreign policy
rights and morality to
of basic
basic human rights
concepts of
to apply
apply concepts
attempts to
33. For recent attempts
of
Possibilities of
and Possibilities
On the
the Limits
Limits and
Borders: On
Beyond Borders:
Duties Beyond
Hoffmann, Duties
Stanley Hoffmann,
issues, see
see Stanley
issues,
1981); Richard
Richard
University Press, 1981);
Syracuse University
N.Y.: Syracuse
(Syracuse, N.Y.:
Politics (Syracuse,
International Politics
Ethical International
Ethical
Jack
1980); Jack
(New York: Holmes && Meier, 1980);
Sovereignty (New
State Sovereignty
Rights and State
Falk, Human Rights
Falk,
Law,
Foreign Policy: Law,
American Foreign
and American
Intervention and
Humanitarian Intervention
Rights, Humanitarian
"Human Rights,
Donnelly, "Human
Donnelly,
(1984): 311-328;
311-328; Robert
of International Affairs 37 (1984):
Journal of
Politics," Journal
and Politics,"
Morality and
Morality
Canadian
and Canadian
Principles and
Foreign Policy:
Policy: Principles
Rights and
and Foreign
"Human Rights
Pratt, "Human
and Cranford
Cranford Pratt,
Matthews and
Matthews
Stohl, "The
"The
Michael Stohl,
and Michael
David Carleton
Carleton and
159; David
(1985): 159;
Quarterly 77 (1985):
Rights Quarterly
Human Rights
Practice," Human
Practice,"
to Ronald
Ronald
Carter to
from Jimmy
Jimmy Carter
Reality from
and Reality
Rights: Rhetoric and
Human Rights:
Policy of
of Human
Foreign Policy
Foreign
"Establishing aa
Jeane Kirkpatrick,
Kirkpatrick, "Establishing
205; and
and Jeane
(1985): 205;
Quarterly 77 (1985):
Rights Quarterly
Human Rights
Reagan," Human
Reagan,"
323.
143 (1981):
(1981): 323.
Affairs 143
World Affairs
Policy," World
Human Rights
Rights Policy,"
Viable Human
Viable
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ized reaction
reaction that
that places the United
United States in aa dilemma.
dilemma. 344 This reasoning
reasoning
leads
leads to
to a consideration of
of the explicit separation
separation of
of morality
morality from
from the interlaw of
of human
human rights as well as from
from foreign policy."
policy.35
national law
The
Kennan's association of legalistic with
with
The first consideration
consideration in light of Kennan's
moralistic thinking is whether
whether there is any conceptual difference between
between inin(I here assume
assume that it qualifies as international
human rights law (I
ternational human
law) and human
human rights morality.36
morality.36 If there
there is such aa distinction, does it make
make
means that, with
with John Austin,
Austin, all international
international law
law is
any difference? If one means
positive morality
morality only, then the difference is without
without meaning.
meaning. The impleof human
human rights policy in domestic
domestic law by sovereign states
states would
mentation of
not be
be obligatory in either case.
case. A human
human rights foreign policy as
as morality
would be
one distinguishes positive international
international law from moralmoralbe suspect. If one
Hart does, however, might
might that conceptual difference
difference have operaity, as Hart
human rights law
law formed
formed part
behavior of governments if human
tional effect on the behavior
of a nation's
nation's foreign
foreign policy? The distinction might make a difference in how
how it
of
that
positive
infor
a
claim
United
States,
policy
of
the
relates to the foreign
is part of foreign policy is
ternational law is
is in effect an auto-limitation on the
37
tooY
If foreign policy is based on positive international
international law, including
state, too.
justification for counterintervention to aid a democratic regime
regime or insur38
law
gency,38
might Kennan's objections be answered? If morality influences law
gency,
Wouldn't the question
and law foreign policy, would it make any difference? Wouldn't
be an empirical one: What are the expectations of the international community?
munity?
argument about an inner
A second consideration deals
inner
deals with Kennan's
Kennan's argument
morality of duty, of responsibility for the effective use of national resources
and restraint in action that will best serve real national interests. Part of this
kind of morality is the reciprocity of acting in such a way that rivals will not
policy
rhetoric in
in foreign
foreign policy
34. A recent shift toward a
a more even-handed use of human rights rhetoric
to
in President Reagan's message
seen in
by the United States in such a
a direction can be seen
message to
Presidential
"Freedom, Regional Security and Global Peace, Presidential
Congress of 15 March 1986. "Freedom,
Message to Congress," New York Times, 15 March 1986, p.
p. 4.
human
35. For aa thorough examination of both the moral and political considerations of human
Human
for the Most
Most Difficult: Human
"Reaching for
rights in foreign policy, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Reaching
Daedalus 112 (1983): 19 (recommending a
Rights as a
a normative use
a Foreign Policy Goal," Daedalus
strategy
states as a
liberal-democratic states
of international human rights in the foreign policy of liberal-democratic
a strategy
an
for transforming
transforming a
based on both moral and political reasons for
a nation-state system into
into an
international system of states that respect human rights).
in the international system
36. Henkin clearly distinguishes between law and morality both in
and Rights
Rights
Human Rights and
"International Human
and in United States domestic law, in his article, "International
in International
International Law (Oxford:
Rights in
in the United State," in Theodor Meron, Human Rights
and morality
morality
1984), 25. The distinction between international law and
Clarendon Press, 1984),
necessary relationrelation15 above,
above, 221-226
221-226 (no
L. A. Hart, note 15
is considered by H. L.
generally is
(no necessary
law
ship between aa sense of moral obligation of states and the existence of international law
or the motivation to adhere to it).
or
auto-limitations
37. See Boyle, note 15 above, 58, for an argument that in effect converts the auto-limitations
and nihilism of positivism into aa functional approach.
Foreign Affairs
38. Cutler, "The
"The Right to Intervene," Foreign
Affairs 64 (1985).
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use one's
one's actions against one's
one's national interests.
interests. Another
Another part
part of this quesis a nation's
nation's responsibility for the
the consequences of the
the effects of its
tion is
foreign
foreign policy used to change human
human rights conditions in other
other countries.
countries.
Kennan
Kennan considers itit morally
morally reprehensible for
for a policy to demand
demand human
human
rights reforms
reforms within specific countries but
but to assume
assume no responsibility for
for
the human
human consequences (if conditions actually worsen)
worsen) because the cost of
of
39
further intervention is
is too high or
or the
the will
will is
is missing.
missing. 39
That
That Kennan
Kennan is
is a political realist in
in the tradition of Machiavelli, Hobbes,
Bentham, and other Europeans
Bentham,
Europeans is scarcely a revelation. A foreign policy of
of
realism of interests
interests in a world dominated
dominated by the sovereign nation-state
nation-state is a
of
fact of life, not
not likely to change in the foreseeable
foreseeable future. The
The traditions of
and
legal
or
legal
realism
philosophical realism and
and logical positivism
positivism
legal
positivism, each of which also separates
separates a kind of "is" of reality from an
"ought"
or of
of a
of
"ought" of
of ontology
ontology or
a more
more just
just world,
world, have
have not
not occupied as much
much of
the
moral
from
distinguishing
clearly
about
as
thinking
Kennan's attention
attention
dearly about
40
relations. 40
the political in
in international relations.
about the political realism he uses in
assumptions
Kennan's
theoretical
Kennan's
thinking about foreign policy in human
human rights can be adapted to diplomacy
Idealizing a merged moral
self-righteousness.
moralistic
moral
without projecting
effect,
in effect,
note 11 above,
above, 210. "We
and Foreign
39. Kennan,
Kennan, "Morality
"Morality and
Foreign Policy," note
"We are
are demanding,
demanding, in
aspecies of veto power over those of their practices that we dislike, while denying responrespon·
a
demands." Ibid.
sibility for whatever may flow from the acceptance of our demands."
Ibid.
40. Not having studied law in the United States (his academic study of law was
was in Germany),
it in
in his writings) that body of
Kennan did not have available (I
(I can find no reference to it
of
emerging critical thought called legal realism which makes precisely the same,
same, although
the international
makes in
more penetrating,
of domestic
domestic legalisms
legalisms as
as he
he makes
in the
international sphere.
sphere.
more
penetrating, critique
critique of
realism is
is Felix S.
of that period
period of legal realism
S. Cohen,
Cohen,
One of the most lucid works of
Review 35
35
Columbia Law
Functional Approach," Columbia
"Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Law Review
"Transcendental
(1935): 809. Kennan
Kennan studied in Germany
Germany in the 20s, when the great German legal tradiof the
was influential.
influential. The
The legal
legal positivists
the historical
historical school was
tion of the
positivists of
the Vienna
Vienna circle
circle were
were
then emerging in Europe
Europe to attempt aa normative science distinct from morality to match
match
idealism by
by Russell,
Russell,
thinking then
and radical
the analytical
analytical and
radical empirical
empirical thinking
then challenging
challenging idealism
in the
the Twentieth
Twentieth Century
Philosophy in
Ayer. See
See Alfred
Alfred Jules
Jules Ayer,
Wittgenstein,
and Ayer.
Wittgenstein, and
Ayer, Philosophy
Century (New
(New
1982), 108-140 for an account of the times.
York: Random House, 1982),
an
in America,
America, he
he might
in the 1980s
1980s in
Were
Kennan to study
study law in
Were Kennan
might find
find illuminating
illuminating an
this traditradilegal criticism.
criticism. Thinkers
post-structuralist American
American legal
and post-structuralist
emerging post-realist
emerging
post-realist and
Thinkers in
in this
docdemystification discourse about legal doction in law faculties use deconstruction and demystification
in ways
ways surprisingly
surprisingly similar
similar to
intellectuals in
from various
various European
European intellectuals
drawn from
trine drawn
to Kennan's
Kennan's
own critique in exposing the avoidance of the substantive conflict or contradiction in forcomparative
For an
an excellent
disputes. For
for resolving
resolving major
major international
mal criteria
criteria for
mal
international disputes.
excellent comparative
About Realism,"
Realism," New
see Twining,
Twining, "Talk
review of legal realism and critical legal studies, see
"Talk About
New
(1985): 329.
Law Review
York University
University Law
Review 60
60 (1985):
329.
that
of the
the law
law to
critical demystification
demystification of
Bentham for
for the
the first
H. L.
L.A. Hart
Hart credits
credits Bentham
H.
first critical
to show
show that
to act.
act. But
But
to act
act or
to forbear
forbear to
or permissions
permissions to
"commands or prohibitions
prohibitions or
or to
laws are simply "commands
'clouded and
and
is,according
according to Benthamn,
this fundamentally imperative character of law is,
this
Benthamn, 'clouded
are not
not
are laws
which are
there are
by an
an illusion
illusion that
that there
ordinary apprehension'
apprehension' by
concealed from
from ordinary
concealed
laws which
in Essays
Essays on
on Bentham,
Bentham,
Law," in
Hart, "The
"The Demystification
Demystification of
imperative at
at all."
all." H.
H. L.
L. A.
A. Hart,
of the
the Law,"
imperative
1982), 23.
23.
Clarendon Press, 1982),
Political Theory
Theory (Oxford:
(Oxford: Clarendon
Jurisprudence and
and Political
Studies in Jurisprudence
foreign policy
policy might
might be
be
approach to
of the
the "legalistic-moralistic"
"legalistic-moralistic" approach
demystification of
Kennan's demystification
Kennan's
to foreign
for effective
effective law.
law.
of the
the role
role of
power for
a recognition
recognition of
viewed similarly,
as a
of power
viewed
similarly, as
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md political
political order
order is
is a psychological operation.
operation. It arises
arises from the denial
denial of
of
tnd
larsh realities of outrageous
outrageous acts
acts against human
human beings such
such as
as official
official toriarsh
me or
or brutalizing
brutalizing violence seen regularly
regularly on television or
or the
the horror
horror of
of
.ure
hinking
annihilation. ItIt arises, too,
too, from
from the avoidance of
of
hinking about a nuclear annihilation.
decisions that
that do
do not
not fit
fit into
into the vision of
of
aking responsibility for substantive decisions
'Norld
order projected from
from national perspectives. The Truman
Truman doctrine (to
world order
iid free
lid
free governments
governments opposing communist domination,
domination, especially Greece
,md
Turkey), the Nixon doctrine (to aid friendly regimes against externally
externally
and Turkey),
:;ponsored
subversion), the Reagan doctrine
doctrine (to sponsor insurgencies
insurgencies against
against
;ponsored subversion),
,\I1arxist,
Third World regimes) 41
41 and similar pronouncements
pronouncements of policy, all
all
vlarxist, Third
of legalistic-moralistic
legalistic-moralistic intellectual attitudes that
that
'est
undue influence of
est on the undue
Jut responsibility for determining
determining results on "doctrine,"
"doctrine," a form of deferral
deferral or
or
:)ut
:lenial of political realism,
realism, according to Kennan.
Kennan. This
This excessively selfJenial
"ighteous
'ighteous national egocentrism
egocentrism harms the long-term
long-term national and
and common
is, seeking to coerce it into
world as it is,
into
nterests. It denies the reality of the world
nterests.
moral actions based on the obliga,:onformity
conformity with right. It confuses tough moral
:ion or duty to act to prevent or ameliorate basic deprivations of human
:ion
-ights
"ights in other countries (as in sanctions against them seeking to change in:ernal behavior or in supporting insurgent
:ernal
insurgent movements
movements to overthrow unjust
unjust
42
for
necessary
:otalitarian
regimes)
42
with
hard
actions
the
naand
appraisals
hard
:otalitarian
Doctrine goes over to the offensive. ItIt upholds
41.
41. Rosenfeld, note 23 above.
above. "The
"The Reagan Doctrine
recover communist-controlled
communist-controlled turf
turf for freedom.
freedom. In
In theory,
liberation, the goal of trying to recover
its reach is universal.
universal. In practice, the places to which the Reagan Doctrine
Doctrine has been applied are aa particular set of Third
Third World
World countries where
where the Marxist grip is relatively recent and therefore presumably
presumably light. This puts Ronald Reagan firmly in
in the older
older
nonintervenAmerican
anti-communist tradition of Woodrow Wilson, who, preaching nonintervenAmerican anti-communist
tion, put American troops ashore at Archangel
Archangel and Vladivostok.
Vladivostok. That effort to strangle
strangle the
Russian Revolution conferred a Wilsonian pedigree
pedigree on subsequent attempts
attempts to undo
Ideologically, the Reagan doctrine challenges the Brezhnev
regimes." Ibid.,
Marxist regimes."
Ibid., 699. Ideologically,
communist regimes
doctrine, supporting
supporting the socialist legal obligation to come
come to the aid of communist
under counter-revolutionary attack, and attempts to demonstrate
demonstrate that it can be reversed.
42.
Elliott
42. Consider this merged moral and political justification in the context of Nicaragua. Elliott
Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Inter-American Affairs (formerly Assistant
Assistant
Human Rights) gives an archetypic expression in his public defense
Secretary of State for Human
of the United
United States support of the contras in their attempt to overthrow the Sandinista
government: A central justification is "our moral responsibility to the people of Nicaragua,
by aa small
small
who fought so hard to win their freedom,
freedom, only to see their revolution betrayed by
.... In Nicaragua, our moral
moral goals and our security interest are
band of Marxist-Leninists....
democracy throughout Central
Central
identical: Democracy in Nicaragua
Nicaragua will reinforce democracy
America,
America, while a totalitarian regime in Nicaragua threatens those fragile democracies.
increase the pressure on the Sandinistas
Thus, the only sensible policy is to continue and increase
Nicaraguan people-for democracy, for freedom and for
to accede to the wishes of the Nicaraguan
13 January
York Times, 13
Pressure on the Sandinistas," New York
"Keeping Pressure
peace." Abrams, "Keeping
1986, p. 15, cols. 2-5.
John
century brand of liberalism of John
Hoffmann similarly opposes the nineteenth century
Stanley Hoffmann
Stuart Mill that was unreservedly anti-interventionist abroad, but for different reasons. He
limits" for
moral and political arguments in favor of intervention "within very strict limits"
gives moral
carefully tailored ends, fully recognizing the possibility for abuses leading to actual harm
for the victims whose autonomy is sought. His moral argument is that a policy of interven-
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43
tional interest as in a clear policy of non-first use of nuclear weapons.
weapons. 43
Sanctions or punishments against aberrent conduct of other governments
governments not in
harmony with the national vision of peace and order are confused with decisions based upon knowledge of the world of power and its control. If hard
analysis of interests shows that human rights interventions are powerful alternatives to polarized internal political and military
military struggles in friendly dictatorships, foreign policy initiatives carefully crafted can prevent an untenable
alliance with a repressive regime while being on the politically "correct"
"correct" side
of an internal struggle for power. Kennan
Kennan would argue that unless the inby
terventions were effective, they could do more harm than good by
unleashing unforeseen consequences or loosening internal structures of
authority for keeping order, leading to polarized internal struggle with no
option but greater military
military force.

tion "would aim not only at spreading the benefits of liberal democracies, but also at overstates' (based on the
coming the antimony between what has been called 'the
'the morality
morality of states'
states' rights) and
and
principle of state autonomy and on the mutual recognition of a range of states'
a cosmopolitan morality that subordinates these rights to the human rights of individuals
Hoffmann, note 35 above, 36-37.
and groups."
groups." Hoffmann,
Kennan's critique implies disagreement with both views for the very reason that they are
Hoffmann's view that
difficult to distinguish. The temptation is to confuse rhetorically Hoffmann's
"noninterventionism
of illiberal
"noninterventionism abandons
abandons the
the victims
victims of
illiberal regimes to their masters"
masters" with
Abrams'
Abrams' justification of moral duty for ideological reasons of state morality (Hoffmann
calls it moral Manichaeism)
Manichaeism) See Kennan, note 32 above, 44, for his view that the selection
"for other people's liberties"
liberties"
in foreign policy decisions of countries in which the concern "for
finds expression, is arbitrary and hence suspect. But note his views of the responsibility of
of
governments for consequences of foreign policy interventions for human
human rights reasons
human
that might place a burden on,
on, for example, the United States to the extent that its human
government permitrights policy was responsible for weakening the traditional forms of government
its
ting the rise of repressive regimes and more serious victimization of human beings than its
policy foresaw. Kennan
Kennan offers imperative arguments of his own. Kennan,
Kennan, "Morality
"Morality and
Foreign Policy," note 1I above, 212-217.
43. Kennan was probably the first to advocate and explain aa U.S. policy against the first use of
of
I above, 110:
nuclear weapons. See Kennan, Memoirs 1950-1963, note 1
110: "Considering
"Considering
such weapons to be suicidal in their ultimate implications, destructive in aa degree which
no purely national objectives could ever justify, and wholly unsuitable as instruments of
of
and
national policy, I had always opposed the basing of our defense posture upon
upon them, and
use' in any major military enparticularly the adoption of the principle of their 'first
'first use'
to
counter. I had pleaded in vain, only two years before, against the decision to proceed to
the development
'first
development of the hydrogen bomb before at least renouncing the principle of 'first
use' and then having another try at international negotiations looking to the outlawing of
use'
of
these and all other weapons of indiscriminate mass destruction." He argued that competition of indefinite duration in weapon development would not be in the national interest,
effectiveness" of the inflexible Pentagon thinkdriven by the "false
"false mathematics
mathematics of relative effectiveness"
ing that became an absolute value. Ibid., 111.
111. His postion was developed as he was leavDepartment in 1949, but it was a personal posiing the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department
"first use"
tion only. Contrary to what many
many contemporary
contemporary critics of the no "first
use" policy believe,
moral wishes) but was based on a hardKennan's thinking was not soft (identified with mora!
headed analysis of political realism and an assessment of confusion in using nuclear
nuclear
weapons
for defensive
a policy
policy of
first use
use regardless
regardless of
of "whether
weapons for
defensive purposes,
purposes, ensuring
ensuring a
of their
their first
"whether
they had been or might
might be used against us, in any major military encounter." George
1900-1950 (Boston: Little Brown,
1967), 472-473.
Kennan, Memoirs 1900-1950
Brown, 1967),472-473.
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Nothing is as
as simply
simply understood
understood from
from the standpoint
standpoint of
of Kennan's
Kennan's critiNothing
cism of the
the effects
effects of
of this
this confusion
confusion as official
official human
human rights positions
positions of the
the
cism
national government,
government, manifested
manifested in
in the
the Helsinki
Helsinki Accords, in tying mostnational
favored
favored nation treatment
treatment to Jewish emigration,
emigration, in
in conditioning
conditioning aid
aid on
on councounrights
deprivations,
reports showing
showing progress
progress in
in eliminating gross
gross human
human
deprivations,
try reports
World countries.
countries. Each of these
these posiposiand in seeking democratization
democratization in Third World
and
national
from
the
variances
and
correct
to
detect
an official act
act meant
meant
correct
national
tions is an
moral vision projected onto
onto the world in order
order to
to transform
transform it. This vision is
is
be
appears
to
it
and
fails
because
realism
by
political
not
driven
political
realism
and
because
appears
to
be
driven
sufficiently
not
Each action
action in
in part is ineffective because itit uses
tough when itit is naive. Each
tough
governments have
have no proper mandate
mandate to
power for a moralistic vision which governments
impose and because
because it engenders
engenders hostility and
and awkwardness
awkwardness in relations
with
energy and rewith other
other countries. Moreover,
Moreover, it dissipates vital national energy
sources best marshalled
marshalled for more
more strategic and
and focused policies.

III.
III. KENNAN'S
KENNAN'S STRUCTURE
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
RElATIONS
Kennan frames his analysis and appraisal
appraisal using three conceptual presupposipresupposibetween the behavior
behavior of governments
governments and that
that
tions. The first distinguishes between
44
Only govproblem of dualism.44
of individuals or peoples, the well-known problem
ernments are responsible for foreign policy. They may choose to be influenced by private moral considerations of public opinion, and are bound by
valid domestic law, but their responsibility is of a wholly different order. Second, the moral
moral obligations of governments, or their commitments, differ
differ
45
is also well known. 45
problem of dual morality is
from those of individuals. This problem
isto represent the national interests, not its
Government's primary obligation is
moral impulses. These interests are military security, political integrity, and
the well-being of its people. They arise from the very existence of national
neither
sovereignty and are necessary to national existence. These needs are neither
good nor bad. They simply are. No moral justification for acting on the basis
is needed. No moral reproach for actions in furtherance of
of those interests is
to
obligation to other governments arises except to
No moral obligation
required.
is
them is
concede the same legitimate interest in national security for their own peocapabilities
ple and, with rival powers, to understand their intentions and capabilities
reciprocally.
reciprocally.
are no
no inis that there are
point Kennan makes is
The third general clarifying point
inmorality which governments could instandards of morality
ternationally accepted standards
ternationally
high-sounding
certain high-sounding
There are certain
they ought to behave morally. There
even if they
voke even
Subasked. Subaccept when
when asked.
readily accept
most governments readily
words and phrases that most
note 13 above.
44. lauterpacht,
Lauterpacht, note
44.
ibid.
45. Ibid.
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scribing to
to the
the carries
carries no danger
danger of
of curtailing
curtailing freedom
freedom" of action,
action, because
because
scribing
so vague or
or ambiguous.
ambiguous. While
While Kennan
Kennan does
does not
not mention
mention the
the UniUnithey are
are so
they
versal Declaration
Declaration of
of Human
Human Rights or the four
four human
human rights treaties
treaties that
that
versal
President Carter
Carter signed
signed and
and sent to
to the
the Senate for
for advice and
and consent
consent to
to ratiPresident
the international
international or
or regional machinery
machinery set
set up
up for
for
nor any
any other
other of the
fication, nor
handling human
that these agreements
human rights disputes, itit is a fair conclusion that
46 He
analysis.46
He does include in
into this category
category for
for Kennan's
Kennan's purposes of analysis.
fall into
pronouncement category the
the Kellogg-Briand
Kellogg-Briand Pact, the
the Atlantic
Atlantic Charter,
Charter,
the pronouncement
of many internathe Yalta Declaration
Declaration on Liberated Europe,
Europe, and
and preambles
preambles of
the
tional agreements.
agreements. He
He also
also relegates to this category
category the
the human
human rights proviprovitional
Accords of 1975,
1975, and presumably
presumably the treaties of human
human
sions of the Helsinki Accords
47
While
parties referred
referred to in the Final Act.
ActY
While signatory
signatory
rights binding on the parties
governments might be held to specific obligations, these international
international inindifferent
that have different meanings
meanings for
for different
struments use words and phrases that
people and are
using the Accords to hold
hold others
others to
to
are but another
another example
example of using
5
standards. 448
United States
States or Western
Western political and
and moral
moral standards.
Kennan's
Kennan's criticism of the use of vague generalities
generalities in various foreign
policy initiatives reflects his realism about the relativity of values in diverse
49
Indeed,
cultures, not any inherently amoral
amoral personal philosophy.
philosophy.49
Indeed, Kennan's
Kennan's
he
own moral
moral positions are highly developed. While
While not explicitly saying so, he
itself-- namely,
namely,
suggests that there are moral bases for the nation-state system itself
of
in the practical way to keep order most effectively; in the independence of
the diverse national cultures that provide protection for and expect alle-

rights
human rights
46. The Helsinki Final Act, which Kennan views with skepticism, refers to many human
Europe
agreements. See Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
State Bulletin 37 (1975):
1975, Department
(Helsinki Accords) signed 1I August 1975,
Department of State
Rights
Ist Sess.,
Sess., Human Rights
Cong., 1st
323-350, reprinted in Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong.,
Documents: Compilation of Documents pertaining to Human Rights, 229-282, and re1292-1325.
printed in International Legal Materials 14 (1975): 1292-1325.
note 46 above.
Final Act, note
47. Helsinki
Helsinki Final
"different
agreements as "different
Soviet-bloc view of human rights agreements
For a complete history of the Soviet-bloc
48. For
of
"The Soviet-Bloc's View of
Jhabvala, "The
Farrokh lhabvala,
systems, see Farrokh
for different social systems,
concepts" for
461.
(1985): 461.
Rights Quarterly 7 (1985):
Human Rights
the Implementation
Implementation of Human Rights Accords," Human
or are
are
agreements are legally binding or
conclusions, whether the agreements
Confirming
Confirming Kennan's conclusions,
and in
theoretically and
governments' view theoretically
how the Soviet-bloc governments'
shows how
Jhabvala shows
declarations, lhabvala
inaccountability inresisting internal accountability
practice allows them to claim full compliance while resisting
practice
InCharter respecting the sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction of states. Inthe U.N. Charter
voking the
be used
liberal conceptions
conceptions can be
law, Western liberal
theory of
of international
international law,
under Soviet theory
deed, under
countries
conditions in countries
and social conditions
economic and
internal economic
attack the internal
instruments to attack
as the instruments
to
interventions to
Western interventions
also resisting
resisting Western
where liberation movements are encouraged while also
or reverse
reverse such movements.
stop or
stop
cultural relativism is fully exand cultural
human rights and
international human
contradiction between international
The contradiction
The
and the ConseConseRelativism and
of Relativism
"The Unanswered
Unanswered Challenge of
in Allison
Allison Renteln, "The
plored in
plored
Donnelly,
Jack Donnelly,
(1985): 514, and in lack
Rights Quarterly
Quarterly 77 (1985):
Human Rights
quences for Human Rights," Human
quences
(1984): 400.
400.
Quarterly 66 (1984):
Human Rights," Human Rights Quarterly
Universal Human
"Cultural Relativity and Universal
"Cultural
Morals
of Western Morals
Brinton, AA History of
Crane Brinton,
of Clarence
Clarence Crane
are aa theme of
dilemmas are
49. These dilemmas
49.
10-11.
1959), 10-11.
Harcourt, Brace,
Brace, 1959),
(New York:
York: Harcourt,
(New
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giance from
from citizens; and in
in the resistance
resistance to the
the implications of a single
single
50
world order.
order.50
world
Kennan
Kennan distinguishes
distinguishes between
between morality
morality of nations in
in the
the external arena,
where sovereign states
states play out their national
national interests cooperatively
cooperatively and
and
where
of individuals within a national
national society in their
their
and morality
morality of
competitively, and
Hume made
relationship to the state
made the same
same disstate and
and each other. David Hume
sense of a citizen's duty to obey the law rests on three
three
tinction.551' Kennan's sense
Hobbesian qualities that
that Kennan accepts
accepts as the basis for law in
in a national
Hobbesian
system.
system. First, the social contract
contract forms
forms the theoretical
theoretical basis for order. It proprobrutish war
war of each
each against all in
vides state protection for citizens against the brutish
and government.
government.5522 Second, states as
as
exchange for their obedience to law and
of hostility. Without the procondition
well as individuals exist in a natural
protection of a state
state in return for the obligation to obey, the citizen would
would be
be
553
3
assumption
states.
This
from
other
hostility
to
this
vulnerable
from other
assumption shapes
vulnerable
his suspicion
Kennan's skeptical view
view of international codes of conduct and his
Kennan's
about the use of vague and high-sounding declarations, presumably including various human
human rights declarations and covenants, which have no means
means
through the state. Third,
Third, law is the comof success in a hostile world except through
mand
mand of Leviathan to a political inferior backed by threats to maintain inter54
nal peace. 54
Given his acceptance of the social contract, Kennan
Kennan believes that if one
one
is
is to have the security and well-being of a system of government
government under law,
one is bound by tacit if not actual consent or estoppel to obey the law as a
50. For aa coherent
coherent explanation
explanation for this position in the views of a historian closely allied to
to
Kennan's
Coli, note 8 above, 5.
Kennan's realism, see Coll,
L. A. Selby·Bigge,
Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed. (Oxford:
51. David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.
51.
1978), 567-569.
Clarendon
Clarendon Press, 1978),567-569.
52. Kennan, note 9 above, 169-170.
na53. Ibid., 169-170. "No
"No one has a moral
moral right to deny on principle his contribution to [the na·
government is at
... unless he is willing to condemn not just the war his government
defense] ...
tional defense]
every one that it has conducted in the past, including that
moment conducting, but everyone
the moment
which established its political independence; and unless he is really prepared to commit
its destinies to the good graces of an extremely jealous and largely hostile outside world. If
all were to do this, there would of course then be nothing to prevent the seizure of the
reins of government
government in this country, entirely
entirely or in part, by any foreign political entity that
wished to seize them
them and could accommodate
accommodate its action to the interests of other foreign
governments."
governments." Ibid.
Ibid.
54. Developed later by Bentham and Austin, this notion describes the realistic allocation or
through yielding freedom for
assumption
assumption of power within a state. Constitutive in character through
supsecurity and partly informal, this concept seems to form the basis for Kennan's fierce supMcCarthy era when
judiciary. Shaped in the McCarthy
port of the power allocated to the American jUdiciary.
in the
the political branches brought enormous power to bear on Kennan's associates in
Department and elsewhere, his preferences favor the principled reason of the inState Department
Constitution as a safeguard. In that sense, the judiciary is a
dependent judiciary under the Constitution
communist
He distrusts the mob-instinct fueled by popular fear of the communist
political superior. He
policy. Kennan, Memoirs
threat brought
brought on by naive and dangerous mistakes in foreign policy.
"It is better, as II see it, to live under
note 9 above, 203: "It
1950-1963, note 1 above; Kennan, note
1950-1963,
and impartially administered than to live under good ones for the proper
bad laws fairly and
of which no adequate judicial sanction exists, just as it is better to have narapplication of
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moral premise.
premise.5555 ItIt is unclear whether
whether he would
would agree with Hume's
Hume's devastamoral
tion of
of the social contract
contract basis
basis for the
the duty to
to obey
obey government
government and ultimately
mately agree
agree with
with Hume
Hume that self-interest and
and advantage form
form the moral
moral
56 It
basis
basis to
to obey, aa utilitarian judgment.
judgment.56
It is
is also a fair
fair question
question whether
whether this
this
moral
moral stance itself conceals a conflict between
between aa pure power
power theory
theory of
of law as
as
command
command of political superior to political inferior backed by coercion and
and
that of a natural
natural law, or religiously derived,
derived, theory
theory of the justification for the
the
57
In
obligation to obey law.
lawF
In calling for an American
American outlook that accepts
"obligations
and changing
changing values, Kennan
of maturity"
maturity" in
in a
a world
world of
of relative
relative and
Kennan
"obligations of
admonishes
admonishes Americans
Americans to be grown
grown up, to "put away childish things"
things" that
that
58
are so dangerous in such
such a
a world.
world. 58
In the arenas of foreign policy, where
where sovereign states still control the effective monopoly
monopoly of coercive power
power over individuals, Kennan's view
view of
of law
law
is clearly positivist and
and relativist, based upon
upon mutually
mutually enforceable specific
59
"obligations"
"obligations" derived
derived from
from consent,
consent, presuming
presuming common
common interests.
interests. 59 In the
the

55.

56.

57.
58.

59.

rower
rower rights guaranteed
guaranteed by independent
independent courts than wider ones against the arbitrary
Kennan, these are
denial or curtailment
curtailment of which
which there is no judicial recourse."
recourse." For Kennan,
distinctly realistic and legitimate claims, with order
order and
and security the predominate values,
whose purpose is aimed at protecting human beings in return for allegiance to the state
through law and the courts.
Kennan's
We find this internal premise stated explicitly and defended
defended most vigorously
vigorously in Kennan's
dialogue with the student
student left in the late 1960s over the issues of civil disobedience in the
the
face of
of the war
war in Viet Nam, with which he profoundly disagreed. Kennan, note 9 above.
Other statements
statements in his memoirs,
memoirs, books, and articles confirm
confirm this moral
moral premise underlying his political theory of government.
government. But
But see Michael Reisman, "The
"The Tormented
Tormented ConJournal 32 (1983):
science: Applying and Appraising
Appraising Unauthorized Coercion," Emory Law 10urna/32
(1983):
of the use of unauthorized
unauthorized violence from Plato's
499 for a psychological consideration of
Crito to modern
modern civil disobedience. For a contemporary critique of the obligation to obey
"The Obligation to Obey the Law," in The Authority of Law
the law, see Jonathan Raz, "The
Law
1979), 233.
(Oxford, Clarendon
Clarendon Press, 1979),
190-191, referring
Harrison,
Harrison, note 55 above, 190-191,
referring to Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature and
concluding that government is a useful human institution which can retain its usefulness
only if it is usually obeyed and not because the people gave promise a long time ago or,
by acquiescence, made
made a tacit bargain today. The obligation to obey more accurately
means that one is obliged to obey from the advantage of having order and security.
Kennan's rhetoric
rhetoric refers to the duty to obey almost as a moral imperative, not as aa utilitarian calculation of advantage, but his reasoning and analysis address the interests of advantage in having a useful institution.
See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon
Clarendon Press, 1979).
1979).
1961),
G.
G. Kennan,
Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: Little Brown,
Brown, 1961),
397-398. These things include "self-idealization and the search for absolutes in world affairs." A
A strong nation wielding great power must share in the guilt of exercising that
"There is no greater American error than the belief that
power when it affects others. "There
in
liberal institutions and the rule of law relieve a nation of the moral dilemma involved in
in
the exercise of power. Power, like sex, may be concealed and outwardly ignored, and in
concealment
our society it often is; but neither in the one case nor in the other does this concealment
save us from the destruction of our innocence or from the confrontation with the dilemmas these necessities imply. When the ambivalence of one's virtue is recognized, the total
ones' opponent is also irreparably impaired." Ibid.
iniquity of ones'
Kennan does not treat seriously the claim that human rights law is a part of international
D'Amato
law that is enforced in external relations by reciprocal sanctions by states, as D'Amato
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of the Helsinki Accords,
Accords, the moral
moral question
question for
for
human rights provisions of
is not
not whether
whether the
the treatment
treatment of
of human
human beings inside the
the Soviet
Soviet
Kennan is
Kennan
Union sometimes
sometimes is
is odious, but why the
the United
United States
States pressed for
for principles
Union
its
its statesmen
statesmen knew
knew could
could not
not be
be met
met without
without a complete
complete transformation
transformation of
of
60 In this comment, Kennan
power within the Soviet Union.
Union.60
Kennan reveals another
another
power
own morality, auto-limitation.
auto-limitation. Again
Again and again
again in his
structural basis for his own
own foreign
foreign policy recommendations, Kennan
Kennan counsels self-limitation and
and
own
guiding conduct of the United States. Negative imperaimperasacrifice as principles guiding
restrain the tendency for moral
moral histrionics at the expense of substance
tives restrain
51 Positive imperatives are
limit the instinct for covert operations.
operations.61
are urgent
urgent
and limit
to gain control over the efficient and effective use of all
all our
our resources (the
<the
concentrate these in averting the twin perils,
deficits, for example) and to concentrate
62
major war and abuse of the natural
natural habitat
habitat of
of the
the environment.
environment. 52
While
While surely strategic, control
control over and concentration of resources and
and
policy have structural implications, for
for the perils are so formidable that the
the
is imperative. The structural modifications are not comcomcooperation of states is
prehensive, as in supranationalism or world federalism.
federalism. They are, nonetheless, at least functional. These structural
structural imperatives are not only founded on
"moral obligation,"
the rational calculation of advantage, but they also entail "moral
to pursue the functions of survival, a common enterprise. A subjective or
or
religious bias may form an inward duty to a higher purpose.
In the calculation of external advantage
advantage in foreign policy, on the other
hand, Kennan seems to discount morality, even though actions taken to
identify and further those interests may
may reflect internal moral
moral opinion as realempiricists and utilitarians folistic parts of the calculus. He resembles the empiricists
of
Bentham, in that sentiments of people merely form part of
Hume
lowing H
ume and Bentham,
a realistic assessment. We choose action to reflect national interest in particular ways without accepting the Kantian moral imperative to act such that
himself
is a principle of universal legislation. Yet Kennan himself
the basis for action is
accepts a very disciplined set of inner standards: "Morality," he writes, "if not
principled, is not really morality." 63
53 The inward moral obligation arises in the
prudent use of power and resources limited to carefully determined
determined national
not in interventraditions,
our
own
within
reasonably
conceived,
interests,
tions in the vague name of human rights, fidelity to treaties, the United Na-

60.
61.
61.
62.
63.

Law,"
in International Law,"
cogently argues. Anthony D'Amato, "The Concept
Concept of Human Rights in
1110. However, Kennan's position does not preclude an
Columbia Law Review 82 (1982): 1110.
Columbia
an
express the
the
may be
used to
to express
rights law
law may
"[h]uman rights
incorporation, the possibility that
inner incorporation,
that "[hJuman
be used
relanationals, that
that relaand its
own nationals,
even between
between a
expectations even
larger community's
community's expectations
larger
a country
country and
its own
tionship being aa juridical construct of international law that may be reflected in domestic
Due ProRights Law
Law to
to Inform
Inform Due
Human Rights
Christenson, "Using
"Using Human
constitutional law." Gordon Christenson,
Pro(1983): 5-6.
5-6.
Law Review
Review 52
52 (1983):
CincinnatiLaw
cess and Equal Protection Analyses," University of
of Cincinnati
207-208.
note 11 above,
above, 207-208.
"Morality and Foreign Policy," note
Kennan, "Morality
212-215.
Ibid., 212-215.
Ibid., 215-217.
211.
Ibid., 211.
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tions
or democracy
democracy based
based on some
some moral
moral duty to detect and cortions Charter,
Charter, or
rect abuse.
abuse.
Kennan's
concepts separates
separates government
government from
from individuals.
Kennan's structure
structure of concepts
A structure
structure of governance
governance relationships, both domestic
domestic and international,
must be
of codes of
of behavior for other
other
be distinguished from
from the
the morality of
governments'
Even the
the treatment
treatment of one's own
governments' treatment
treatment of their citizens. Even
citizens rests on aa relative morality, the moral
moral and cultural traditions
traditions informinforming the particular internal
Stone
internal political structures
structures of that state. Julius Stone
associates this difference
difference of treatment
treatment with diverse "human
"human justice constituconstitu64 Kennan accepts the nation-state system with this explicit dualism,
encies."
encies."o4
Kennan
system
dualism,
a constitutive structure resting on worldly presuppositions ultimately
ultimately normative. Since states are
are diverse enclaves of
of justice, the nation-state
nation-state system
system
which protects that variety while serving the needs of human
human justice might
might
65
to rest
be said
said to
rest on
on a
a moral
moral foundation.
foundation. os
STRUCTURE
IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE
THE CONCEPTUAL
CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE
FOR HUMAN
HUMAN RIGHTS

of his concepKennan's postulates allow us to construct an approximation of
foreign
human rights norms
norms in foreign
tual position that might undergird
undergird the use of human
associpolicy. His conservative theories about the state and government,
government, his associexerpolitical realism for statecraft in exerand morality,
morality, his
his critical
critical political
ation of law and
all derived from
from
cising the power of government, and his view of duty, are all
these postulates. He is
isexplicit in the importance he attaches to his personal
religious values which influence his thinking, but he tries to keep personal
of national
national incalculation of the
the requirements
requirements of
preference separate from his calculation
terests, accepting cultural relativism as aa basis for deference to other political
"deep-structure" critique of the foundation of the
systems. He attempts no "deep-structure"
and seeks
seeks to
to further
further
the reality
reality of
of what exists
exists and
system, but
but accepts
accepts the
nation-state system,
the national and common interests as he sees them,
them, using the traditional
highly critical
critical of
of universal
governments. Yet
Yet he
he is
power of governments.
is highly
universal structures,
structures, espeespecially the American penchant for detecting and correcting aberrant behavior
most closely
closely
high-sounding principles
of foreign
foreign governments
using high-sounding
governments using
principles most
conventions.
associated in recent years with human rights conventions.
is best
best develdevelLaw as aa coercive order made applicable to individuals is
according
to
the
political
oped under aa domestic system that might vary
coercive
history and unique conditions of a people. Until the monopoly of coercive
or
global
authority
(a
the
nation-state
to
a
supranational
force shifts from
a
(a
transformation of power not likely to happen soon if ever), we should accept
Justice (Baltimore:
64. Julius Stone, Visions of World Order: Between State Power and Human Justice
91-101.
1984), 91-10l.
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984),
65.
Butterfield, note 7 above, 50.
65. See Butterfield,
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the reality of keeping world public order through national systems.
systems. 66
As a
matter of foreign policy, international
international agreements
agreements that are not enforceable
by reciprocal arrangements
arrangements ought not be invoked to affect the behavior of
another country toward its own citizens.
If this summary
summary fairly represents Kennan's conclusions as I have interpolicy, are those conclupreted their application to human rights in foreign policy,
sions valid? Is
Is Kennan at last to be heard? Are his views adequate in taking
account of the transformations in power relationships that appear to make
human rights concerns as strategic and important as nuclear weapons and
Is Kennan's argument for a moral obligation for removing
global ecology? Is
the threat of nuclear or ecological disaster more
more cogent than one for ameliorating gross abuse of human
human dignity?
dignity?
Prudence may indeed place high priority on the intractable problems of
major war and the environment, but what makes them any more of a moral
moral
or political obligation upon governments than the protection of fundamental
human rights? The answer seems to lie in the construct Kennan brings to his
system. He writes frequently of the
realistic understanding
understanding of the nation-state system.
relationship between responsibility or obligation and power.

Despite frequent assertions to the contrary, not everyone in this world isisresponsible, after all, for the actions of everyone else, everywhere. Without the power to
is no responsibility for its absence. In
compel change, there is
In the case of governis important for purely practical reasons that the lines of responsibility be
be
ments it is
kept straight,
straight, and that there be, in
in particular,
particular, aa clear
clear association
association of
of the power
power to
to
67
action or
of action
consequences of
with the
act with
the consequences
or inaction.
inaction. 67
act
Power
Power resides in the nation-states and the special power to control
great
nuclear weapons and environmental harm lies predominately with the great
powers. The power to control the behavior of individuals resides in the internal domestic systems of coercive order traditionally exercised by sovereign
states. One state cannot easily intervene in another state's internal relationship of government to citizen (with or without justification in law or morality)
without a major claim to displace, weaken, or subordinate the authority
authority
68
structure of that government.
government. 68
states have no claim to authority or control
69 They
over the internal political independence or integrity of other states. 69
They
of
may have sufficient power to intervene or to control, but in the calculus of
66. Kennan,
Kennan, "Morality
and Foreign
Foreign Policy,"
Policy," note
note 1 above,
above, 206.
206.
"Morality and
67. Ibid.,212.
Ibid., 212.
68. See Richard Lillich ed., Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (Charlottes-

ville,
of Virginia,
Virginia, 1973)
1973) for
detailed exploration
the problem of
of
ville, Va.:
Va.: University
University Press
Press of
for a
a detailed
exploration of
of the
the legality of major power interferences in the international affairs of other states committing human
human rights offenses against
against their own
own populations
populations even when such repressive
repressive acactions
shock the
the conscience
or threaten
threaten the
peace.
tions shock
conscience or
the peace.
69. The principle of illegality for threats to a nation's territorial integrity or political independence is
is reflected in Article 2(4)
2(4) of the U.N. Charter. Despite the purposes of the
the
Charter
human rights of
of all
all peoples,
peoples, the
the Soviet-bloc
Soviet-bloc have
have invoked
invoked consistently
consistently
Charter to promote human
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cost and benefit, the costs are high and the claims to control may be quite inefficient. The principle of political independence and nonintervention encapsulate experience from the Peloponnesian wars to the Napoleonic wars
and the twentieth century wars. The costs may be high indeed when a foreign power seeks to intervene
intervene to control the internal affairs of another counis by a major
major
try, even when conquered or even when the intervention is
is being repressed or
power. Costs may be less when the local population is
is to counter the repression of a democratic
brutalized and the intervention is
democratic
70
insurgency.
insu
rgency. 70
In the cases of nuclear weapons and global ecology, however, (and
perhaps also ir,
ir. the global economy and communications) the planetary inused
terests transcend those of the nations and demand that state power be used
stop
gross
to
to eliminate the threats to all. States themselves have power
power
abuses of human rights and improve conditions within their own borders,
but without the cooperation of other states they have no power
power to eliminate
the threats to all from major
major war and ecological destruction. As nuclear proliferation and widespread ecological destruction threaten to escape the control of even the great powers, the interest of all in yielding to international
natural
control heightens. The Hobbesian world of Leviathans coexisting in a natural
is a precondition for yielding autonomy for survival and
and
state of hostility is
is in a nation's interest for all other nations to
order. Hume's notion that it is
dilemma. If a
cooperate in keeping order, while it does not, describes the dilemma.
state has power, the capacity to defect from a cooperative standard of interincreases.7 11 This dilemma
national order increases.7
dilemma in contemporary
contemporary theory of public
choice is well-known.
well-known.7722 A nation has no narrow
narrow self-interested incentive to
cooperate when it has power, only when it needs the power of others.
itself?
Or is
is it rather that Kennan's structure, with circular logic, answers itself?
Governments ought not threaten each other's internal order in human
Governments
human rights
matters because it would be incompatible with the existing power of the
equilibrium of existing power if an outside force
state and destabilizing of the equilibrium
claimed a basic part of the allegiance and protection of local citizens. The
The
revolutions, allegedly encouraged by human
fear of internal changes and revolutions,

70.

71.
71.
72.

aa narrow interpretation of Article 2(7),
2(7), the domestic jurisdiction reservation, that any inin·
unwarranted international accountability for internal human rights compliance is an unwarranted
461, 490.
terference with their domestic affairs. See Jhabvala, note 48 above, 461,
See Cutler, note 38 above, 96 (the principle of counter-intervention
counter·intervention in support of
democratic movements
movements or governments
governments does not emasculate Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter).
Hume, note 51 above.
dilemma, beginning with the well-used
Russell Hardin summarizes and extends this dilemma,
"prisoner's dilemma"
dilemma" by
by using
using game
game theory
in dynamic
dynamic collective
collective action. The incentive for
"prisoner's
theory in
a participant to defect and not cooperate in collective action while presuming
presuming aa free ride,
is the basis for the dilemma in the theoretical model.
model. A major power's responsibility is not
to get trapped in the dilemma when survival is the issue. Russell Hardin,
Hardin, Collective Action
(Baltimore:
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 16-37.
16-37.
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pressures by aa major
major power
power (as some
some claim
claim happened
happened in Iran
Iran and
and Nicrights pressures
of control, especially
especially when
when the
the control was
was
aragua) loosens
loosens internal
internal bonds
bonds of
aragua)
maintained by repressive
repressive measures,
measures, and is likely
likely to
to yield even
even more
more represmaintained
sive successor
successor regimes.
regimes.
sive
One answer
answer is
is to work within
within the
the power
power structure
structure of
of nation-states,
nation-states, a
7 33
Indeed,
Indeed, various external human
human rights
moral justification by rasion
rasion d'etat.
d'etat.7
moral
toward the Philippines
Philippines tapped
tapped a nascent democratic revolution
revolution
policies toward
whose strength
strength toppled
toppled the Marcos
Marcos regime. Something
Something more
more powerful,
whose
work than
than can be
be attended
attended exclusively within the
the internal
internal
then, might
might be at
at work
then,
order system of
of each country
country without
without international
international meddling. The new
new
order
foreign policy, which
which uses human
human rights to justify support for
Reagan foreign
as
democratic insurgencies against repressive regimes from the right as well as
the left, revises earlier formulations. Recent
Recent experience in the Philippines,
the
justifies the new
new revision and thus
Haiti, Chile, and South Africa presumably justifies
7 44
From
From
supports aid to the
the contras in Nicaragua
Nicaragua and insurgencies elsewhere.
elsewhere.7
supports
for
policy,
formulate such a human rights
Kennan's premises, he would not formulate
Kennan's
is clear that in any
it may
mayor
may not serve the national interest, although it is
any
or may
required, Kennan would not hesitate to allow moral
moral
given situation when required,
sensibilities to coincide with national interest. Even though any intervention
Bangladesh,
required in the national interest, as in the Indian intervention in Bangladesh,
countries' intervention
American intervention in Grenada or the African countries'
the American
in Uganda, might be technically illegal (although all unilateral interventions
are wrapped in some form of legality such as self-defense), it might also be
considered moral.
It is
is not altogether clear that the same reasoning will not apply to
nuclear power and global ecology, too. Kennan's acceptance of a moral
obligation for a foreign policy of one category of dangers but not the other
seems rooted less in the capacity to use power than in the calculation of will
to use it effectively. Any moral obligation for Kennan derives from the duty
objectives
of the national government to use its resources for limited but vital objectives
to avert a threat to the whole, including its own people, and not to interfere
calrelations with their own citizens. The calwith other governments'
governments' internal relations
not a Kantian view of aa
culation
culation seems one of cost-benefit, aa utilitarian one, not
large, grounded
government's universal moral obligation
obligation to human beings at large,
howin an inner
inner imperative applied to its own actions. ItIt isisentirely possible, howpejoradoes not deserve the pejoraand does
73.
73. Butterfield's study of raison d'etat is similar to Kennan's and
87-96.
note 88 above, 87-96.
Coil, note
"statist." See Coli,
to the term "statist."
tive connotation
connotation given to
tive
can be
be no doubt
"In this
this global revolution, there can
74.
March 1986, p. 4: "In
Times, 15 March
New York
York Times,
74. New
human rights and oppose tyranny
stands. The American people believe in human
where America stands.
where
right. We use our influence to encourage
form, whether of the left or the right.
in whatever
whatever form,
other countries' traditions and political
that respect other
careful ways that
democratic
change, in careful
democratic change,
internal
or internal
external or
them face from external
of them
many of
the security
security threats that many
realities
as the
as well as
realities as
note
in Rosenfeld,
Rosenfeld, note
doctrine, in
Reagan doctrine,
of the Reagan
appraisal of
See aa recent appraisal
totalitarianism." See
forces of totalitarianism."
forces
above.
23 above.
23
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is indeed in the national interests
ever, for aa political calculus to show that it is
of the United States to use human rights abuses to justify influencing events
is neither a moral nor a legal
within another country even though there is
is that such a policy can lead to
obligation to act. The danger, of course, is
coercive intervention when authority structures weaken or change and the
the
counter-government.7 55
become counter-governmenU
national policy objectives widen to become
hold
If there is
is no basis for aa moral obligation for one government
government to hold
other governments accountable for their internal human rights practices,
of
is available, might there be a duty to act on the basis of
even if the power is
legal obligation? It is at this point in understanding Kennan that his association of the moral with the legal deserves critical analysis. If Kennan,
Kennan, as he has
written, respects the sovereign equality of the nation-state tradition and institutions of international law, as well as specific, contractual obligations in
treaties, he must not also take the purely Austinian view that international
law is nothing but positive morality. Legal obligations may and do arise, by
consent, between governments.
he
governments. The institutions of international law he

75.
75. The reality is that countries intervene for purely national or ideological reasons, as haphap·
pened in the Spanish Civil War. Carr explains: "[T]he
"[T]he notion had grown up since the first
world war
war that a country whose internal organization was based on a certain political
theory was expected to encourage and assist the triumph of that theory in other countries.
This policy was pursued by the Soviet Union prior to 1927, and was adopted later by
by
.... In nearly all such cases, it seems difficult to distinguish between the
other countries ....
supposed interests of a political theory and the national interests of the invervening coun·
country."
Edward Carr, International Relations Between the Two World Wars 1919-1939 (New
(New
try." Edward
York: St. Martin's Press, 1967),
1967), 270.
The United Nations Charter
Charter sought to prevent just such major
major power interventions
through outlawing force by one state against another
selfanother except for collective action and selfdefense. Various interventions
interventions initially have rested on humanitarian or protection of nationals grounds
grounds but subsequently have changed rapidly to reflect broader, counterauthority
intervention in the Dominican Republic in
authority objectives, as in the United States intervention
1965, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, the Congo
Congo intervention,
intervention, the Indian intervention in Bangladesh, and others. These trends formed the backdrop for the Charlottesville conference of experts on the subject leading to skepticism about the doctrine of humanitarian
manitarian intervention, but a concern for human rights deprivations in the face of United
Nations impotence. Lillich, note 68 above, containing essays by Professors Brownlie,
Farer, and Reisman.
The late Wolfgang
prinWolfgang Friedmann pointed out the difficulty in formulating any kind of principles of international law on the subject of humanitarian
humanitarian intervention without authority
authority
from the United Nations under collective security provisions. That inquiry inevitably
raised "fundamental
law." Ibid., 36. He asked:
international law."
"fundamental questions of the structure of international
"Are we not then comingcoming- openly or in disguise-to
disguise- to our own preferences? In other words,
we accept intervention
intervention for purposes that we regard as desirable because we dislike the
the
structure of the government
government in question?"
question?" Ibid. He postulated the possibility of a morally
morally
valid but
but legally invalid
invalid intervention for humanitarian purposes exclusively, a grey and
valid
developing area of international law, as in the Indian intervention in Bangladesh. Humanitarian interventions by the United States in Grenada, Central
Central America,
America, and in terrorist
situations pose even more difficult questions of morality and law than addressed in the
For a full treatment
treatment of the major
major instances of humanitarian intervenconference in 1972. For
tion before World War I, see Louis Sohn and Thomas Buergenthal,
Buergenthal, International Protec(Indianapblis: Bobbs-Merrill,
Bobbs-Merrill, 1973),
1973), 137-194.
tion of Human Rights (Indianapolis:
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are those of a structural or
or constitutive character, not
not those
those of
of a set
set
respects are
of
of norms
norms in a cosmopolitan
cosmopolitan sense
sense where
where the individual
individual has
has a direct relation
relation
with
with the international
international community
community bypassing
bypassing the
the social contract of nations
with
with citizens for allegiance and protection.
protection.7766 But
But they are
are international law
law
norms
norms nonetheless.
nonetheless.
For
would arise
arise
For Kennan,
Kennan, I believe, legal obligation among
among governments
governments would
from customs, traditions, and agreements
agreements reciprocally followed
followed by states
states in
from
referred to by Hart as the
the set
set
their mutual
mutual relations. This international law is referred
their
power
primary rules of obligation
obligation among nations. But there is no unifying power
of primary
or recognized as legitimate, as there
which they are changed,
changed, invalidated,
invalidated, or
by which
is
is in advanced municipal
municipal systems. Secondary rules of recognition,
recognition, often
function.
spelled out in constitutions, provide this unifying and validating function.
The
particuThe validating rules in various
various countries recognize the legitimacy of particuprimary rules that develop from within. In
In the international
international system,
system, we
lar primary
have
have only the most
most rudimentary
rudimentary worldwide process for
for validating or changing customs and traditions
traditions among nations. Hart thinks we may
may be working
working
more unified international system
system by similar secondary norms
norms
also toward a more
is that Kennan would not think
of recognition as yet undeveloped. My guess is
this development
development realistic, but that he
he would accept as workable the few imHe
portant rules of reciprocal custom and agreement that are effective. He
rules
the
for
changing
a
super-system
would not think it necessary to have
have
international agreements, or respect for the
about jurisdiction, territory, international
political independence of other states. He might
might characterize such attempts
as avoiding complex substantive problems.
77 Either
Hart's analytic structure is not realistic enough.
enough. 77
Either
Others believe Hart's
way, primary
primary rules among nations are
are community
community expectations we label
obligations. They do not require for their effectiveness a formal process to
is re(or functional) unity is
valid. 788 When a structural (or
tell us which rules are valid.7
quired by cooperation to solve certain intractable problems, however, a second set of constitutive norms or principles may become necessary.
primary imperative to refrain from intervention
Kennan would accept a primary
of
independence of
or coercion against the territorial integrity or political independence
76. See Hoffmann, note 35 above, 36-37, for a
a thesis employing the cosmopolitan approach
relations.
international relations.
to aa limited transformation of the structure of international
"The analytical ap77. McDougal,
McDougal, Lasswell,
Lasswell, and Reisman view this concept as inadequate. "The
of rules
rules
proach has been too much obsessed by aa sterile notion of law as aa body of
of social
social
'sovereign' source to observe any wider context of
emanating from some internal 'sovereign'
a world constitutive process; its more recent assumption of certain
processes, much less a
rules ofofupon 'primary'
'primary' rules
'validity' upon
ill-defined 'secondary' rules which mysteriously bestow 'validity'
"The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative
fers but aa modest expansion of view." "The
InternaMichael Reisman,
Reisman, InternaS.McDougal
Decision," revised and reprinted in Myres S.
McDougal and W. Michael
191, 199.
199.
tional Law Essays (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1981), 191,
tional
society may live by rules imposing obligations on
228-231. "[A]
15 above, 97, 228-231.
78. Hart, note 15
"IAJ society
its members
members as 'binding,' even though they are regarded simply as aa set of separate rules,
that the
the mere
It is
is plain
rule. It
plain that
mere
not unified by or deriving their validity from any more basic rule.
228.
rule." Ibid., 228.
existence of rules does not involve the existence of such aa basic rule."
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another country,
country, subject
subject to
to traditional
traditional self-defense.
self-defense. The
The purpose
purpose of
of this
this
another
of the
the power
power of
ofthe
the nationnationobligation would
would be
be to
to preserve
preserve the
the constitution
constitution of
obligation
system for
for recognizing
recognizing and
and enforcing
enforcing rules
rules within
within the
the municipal
municipal
state system
state
system. IfIf the
the character
character of
ofthe
the international
international legal
legal obligation
obligation changes
changes to
to affect
affect
system.
primary
or secondary
secondary norms
norms of
of national
national systems,
systems, as
as in
in the
the specification
specification of
of
primary or
the civil, political,
political, social,
social, and
and economic
economic rights
rights and
and duties
duties of
of human
human beings
beings
the
governments, then
then Kennan
Kennan becomes
becomes skeptical,
skeptical, for itit may
may be
be necesnecesand their
their governments,
and
own interests
interests at
at variance
variance from
from such
such claims
claims in
in
for a nation
nation to
to act
act for
for its
its own
sary for
But these
these matters
matters are
are best
best left
left to
to the
the culturally diverse, interinterspecific cases. But
nal
of governments,
governments, in the absence of
of aa stronger
stronger international
international
nal processes of
system.
system.
Kennan
as an
an absolutist, but
but rather
rather for
for
Kennan accepts the
the statist position,
position, not
not as
of the need
need to
to exercise
exercise power
power to provide
provide order
order in
largely practical reason
reason of
the largely
decentralized, relativist world.
world. Moreover,
Moreover, even
even the present
present rules
rules of interintera decentralized,
national law
law are far too vague
vague and
and have far too
too little agreement
agreement about
about their
their
national
of one
one government
government to be
be given
given preferprefermeaning to allow the interpretations
interpretations of
meaning
en~e through
through its foreign policy insistence on accountability by another
another for
ence
79
detection and correction of
of internal
internal abuse.
abuse.79
Now suppose, as consensus suggests, that certain of the
the various human
rights are considered fundamental
fundamental and have compelling
compelling importance
importance in state
are they obligatory on all governgovernuniversal agreement. Not only are
practice by universal
omnes,80 but also they may
ments under positive international law, erga omnes,80
may
peremptory
cogens.181l These kinds of norms have a peremptory
have the character of jus cogens.
permits no derogation by any
any
quality under customary international law that permits
demand" amount
amount to legal obligations
state. 82 Should not these "intensities in demand"
of such an overriding affirmative character that national governments acting
acting
on behalf of the entire international community must enforce these norms
for the benefit of individuals even if not in the immediate political interest of
83
As in the Draft Restatement of
the nation through its foreign policy?
policy?83

rules
secondary rules
of secondary
validating procedure entailed by the emergence of
accept the validating
79. Even ifif we accept
of law requires the justificaan adequate
adequate concept of
out, an
of recognition, as D'Amato points out,
of
positivists
inability of the positivists
the inability
deal with the
in addition to the test of pedigree to deal
tion of content in
See Anthony
are separated. See
morality and
and law are
once morality
questions once
to handle
handle the moral questions
to
Review 21
University Law Review
Valparaiso University
Dilemma of Positivism," Valparaiso
"The Moral Dilemma
D'Amato, "The
D'Amato,
43.
(1985): 43.
to all.
Flowing to
80. FloWing
law.
81. Compelling
Compelling law.
81.
512-515.
15 above,
above, 512-515.
82. Brownlie, note 15
(Revised)
States (Revised)
of the
the United
United States
of Foreign Relations
Relations Law of
See Restatement
Restatement of
at 224-225. See
83. Ibid. at
S.
and comment
comment 11 and m; Myres S.
Sec. 702
702 and
1985) Sec.
Vol. 1,
1, 12 April 1985)
Draft No.6,
No. 6, Vol.
(Tent. Draft
(Tent.
Order
Public Order
and World
World Public
and lung
Lung Chu
Chu Chen, Human Rights and
Lasswell, and
Harold lasswell,
McDougal, Harold
McDougal,
in aa comjus cogens
cogens in
(insisting on
on jus
338-350 (insisting
Press, 1980),
1980), 338-350
University Press,
(New Haven:
Haven: Yale University
(New
But
demand). But
of demand).
facts of
of intensities
intensities of
the social
social facts
based on
on the
global constitution,
constitution, based
prehensive global
prehensive
Hart's secondsecondfrom Hart's
conceptually from
norms differ
differ conceptually
peremptory norms
ofthe
the peremptory
this latter
latterview of
how does
does this
how
rules of recognition?
recognition?
ary rules
ary
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84
or in recent recommendations
Foreign Relations Law of the United States 84
for inclusion as part of foreign policy, the most
most basic general obligation
would be "to
lito halt the suffering caused by torture, detentions, extra-judicial
executions and starvation."I
starvation." 8Ss
is possible for Kennan to accept a legal obligation, narrowly
I think it is
constructed from positive international law, without associating it necessarily with a moral
moral obligation of governments. He could be consistent by viewing such a legal obligation conceptually not as a claim to change the strucenforcement by one
ture of the international order through unilateral enforcement
government acting as international agent in the internal affairs of another,
but as an affirmative duty to cooperate with all other states to ensure that
their governments
governments implement
implement these general obligations internally. But that
is precisely what most governments have already agreed to and
and
obligation is
what Kennan finds meaningless. Putting aside the regional and international
international
institutions for enforcing the human
human rights conventions, and even distinguishing between intervention and interference, might nations act as agents
to enforce human rights of other countries'
countries' nationals on behalf of the interIs it possible to go beyond the legal obligation affecting
national community? Is
primary
norms among governments without directly challenging the strucprimary norms
ture of the present system of nation-states which Kennan has accepted by his
initial realistic premises?
Kennan does challenge the present structure by his affirmative imperatives to eliminate the threats of major war and of ecological destruction even
if his narrowest
narrowest change has a strategic or functional focus. Moreover, as in
the Nuremberg Principles, individuals acting under state orders preventing
the performance of a specific obligation against nuclear proliferation or use
or against ecological degradation may have direct duties running to international law which may not be excused by superior orders. Unless Kennan adtionallaw
mits the defeat of the dilemma that a nation's
nation's own self-interest permits it to
defect from such norms, but not to permit any other nation to defect, then
he must find some way to enforce directly the important obligations of international law between the nation and its officials in conduct toward its
citizens and toward other nations. A functional international regime may be
be
himthe only feasible alternative, a structural change anticipated by Kennan himself years ago, in the Baruch and other plans. Transition to such a regime
regime
would require yielding a piece of the statist assumptions Kennan makes.
While I have no doubt that Kennan reached his conclusions about the
structure that
impractical and
and prudent
prudent reasons
reasons of
policy, the
twin perils
perils for
for practical
twin
of policy,
the structure
that im-

84. Restatement, note 83 above. Section 702 lists genocide, slavery or slave trade, state
state
murder
murder or disappearance of individuals, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic
internationally
racial discrimination, and consistent patterns of gross violations of internationally
its
recognized human rights, as violations of customary international law if a
a state by its
encourages, or
or condones
condones any of them.
them.
policy practices, encourages,
85. Matthews and Pratt, note 33 above.
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is not capable, without modification, of
plicitly undergirds his thinking is
achieving his main moral concerns. His thinking about human rights, based
as it is on a rejection of his own projections of the evils of a "legalistic-moral"legalistic-moralistic"
istic" approach to foreign policy, explains why his own realism may be
be
trapped in structural contradiction. Kennan's own assumptions about the
nation-state system also rest on certain conceptions of law and morality, but
he seems to avoid the demystification of these assumptions. Moreover, these
assumptions may not describe actual patterns of authority and effective control from within the international community. For example, judicial power is
one of the little-noticed parts of Austin's
meaning
Austin's definition of law that gives meaning
applied to international human
to Kennan's realism when aflPlied
human rights. I refer to
the meaning of political superiority, when human rights demands
demands take political form from within a state and are given recognition by courts. In addition,
claims made powerful by people, compelling interests and, today, international movements
movements from multinational corporations, international organizations, and covert or terrorist organizations have to enter any realistic appraisal of interests and power, as McDougal,
McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman explain
in their comprehensive jurisprudence and as Julius Stone summarizes in his
86
last work. 86
Kennan's
Kennan's near statist view of the legitimacy of the power of the
the
sovereign state does not square with his own political realism when one
observes the power of the demands for human
human rights against abuses by
brutal governments. In the subordination of human
of
human rights theory to that of
the old social contract basis of the nation-state, traditional political realism
itself may shun facing the political power claims from within the state. In the
same way that Kennan recognized the advanced power of the American
judiciary under an updated Hobbesian version of protection, so also political
reality of unmet demands of people ready to be organized into formal power
claims cannot be ignored.8877 These claims are as real, although the political
86. Lasswell, McDougal,
McDougal, and Reisman, note 77 above; Stone, note 64 above.
87. Note the political use of human rights from aa purely national interest perspective in
tapping the demands
demands from within a nation such as Chile. Career
Career diplomat Harry G.
Barnes,
Barnes, Jr., Ambassador to Chile from the United States, uses the human rights organizations and moderate opposition to President Pinochet's government to support aa transition
some
to democracy. The General has publicly stated, in opposition, that the "function of some
diplomats" was not to act as "correctors," for that would mean leaving behind "the
"the
diplomats"
minimum norms
norms of good relations." Yet, the apparent reality is one of capturing the
political spirit of the people for the foreign policy objective of preventing
preventing more
more radical factions to benefit from the government's
government's intransigence. New York Times, 27 January 1986,
p. 6.
A New York Times editorial was quick to discern this kind of shift in the human rights
6. A
policy of the United States in Haiti and the Philippines, noting "the
"the Administration's
Administration's
roundabout return to an even-handed
even-handed human rights policy. After an initial coddling of
of
'friendly authoritarians'
authoritarians' and
and South Africa's racist regime, it now champions American
'friendly
values
values on aa wide front. The effect, if not the motive, is also to enhance respect for
America's
hostility to leftist tyrannies."
New
America's hostility
tyrannies." Editorial,
Editorial, "Mr. Reagan Scores for Democracy," New
York Times, 8 February
February 1986, p. 18.
This editorial rhetoric
rhetoric is indeed the object of Mr. Kennan's criticism. It illustrates the
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well-defined, as those protected in Western democrachannels are not as well-defined,
cies through the courts or parliament.
of
I have reached my critical conclusion about Kennan's association of
morality and human
human rights law most cautiously and gingerly, for the lucidity
and integrity of Kennan's voice heard over the decades so vastly outclasses
risk
that of his detractors or of those he aptly calls the moral meddlers, that to risk
this conclusion may weaken his own critique. Kennan
Kennan should be applauded
for revealing the concealed avoidance of substantive conflict in thinking that
moral or legal codes can determine outcomes. This kind of critique, howmore than ever needed to show that even the structural asis now more
ever, is
sumptions Kennan relies upon in this contemporary era
era-the
- the fictional social
88
compact based on natural law duties between citizens and governments,
governments,66
the presumed
presumed exclusivity of the nation-state in the international power structure, the predilection for preserving that structure89
69 and the implications of
of
his statist realism - all require a more thoughtful and penetrating inquiry. The
The
human
human rights side of the obligations of foreign policy places restraints and affirmative duties on governments in relation to their citizens. Challenges
Challenges to
the legitimacy of the state from unauthorized minor coercion (we call it the
international terrorist phenomenon), the other side of the problem,
problem, represent coercive claims to power. The one structurally may be related to the
other, for a weakened state cannot protect its citizens' rights. Ultimately
Ultimately
strengthening the power of the state in repressing unauthorized coercion by
measures of state violence may also lead to
potentially equally repressive measures
human rights deprivations and a denial that things might be transformed
transformed into
a more civilized wor/d.
world. The paradox may simply reinforce Kennan's own
sense of the human condition as tragic.
policy, for
for the
of
easily leads
realists to
to resist
resist aa human
human rights
confusion that
that easily
leads to
to realists
rights policy,
the purpose
purpose of
an
not necessarily to
to champion
champion American
American values,
values, an
human rights in foreign policy is
is not
egocentric idea of detection and correction, but to act as an agent of the international
community using a
a few well-established principles of international law as well as the naadministration's revision of foreign policy in
tional self-interest. Whether
in
Whether the Reagan administration's
of
regional security adequately enfolds human rights concerns when repressive regimes of
is not clear, nor does itit necessarily address
both the right and the left are involved is
of
Kennan's main points. While even-handed and high-toned,
high-toned, it does contain language of
country's own
own traditions;
realism and national interests based on appraisal of another country's
traditions; but
but
it seems to rest on aa Wilsonian vision of democratic revolutions encouraged by aa politi34 above.
cized human rights foreign policy. See "Presidential Message to Congress," note 34
88. In
In his "Yencken hypothesis"
hypothesis" Falk stated that a
a contractual relationship between
between a
a people
sustained without
the use
of
government at
the level
nation-state cannot
cannot be
and its government
at the
level of
of nation-state
be sustained
without the
use of
repressive force so long as the territorial nation-state system continues. For consensual
social
contract at
that level,
necessary at
same time
rule under social
social contract
is necessary
at the
the same
time to
to have
have a
a social
rule
at that
level, itit is
guidance
contract on a
a global level, as aa prelude to aa transition to nonterritorial central guidance
of
functions and redistribution of power, wealth, and influence. Richard Falk, A Study of
Future Worlds (New York: Free Press, 1975). For aa critique, see Stone, note 64 above, 13,
33-40.
33-40.
once told the student
89. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign
Foreign Policy," note 11 above, 206. Kennan
Kennan once
left that he was far more radical than they, for he wanted structural changes to be made in
government.
government. Kennan, note 99 above, 204, 228.
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Myres McDougal
McDougal and
and Harold
Harold Lasswell
Lasswell were
were the
the first
first to
to propose
propose a comcomMyres
prehensive jurisprudence
jurisprudence of human
human dignity
dignity attempting
attempting to accommodate
accommodate
prehensive
and decisions
decisions and
and looking
looking toward aa different
different future
power, authority, values, and
world
world process.
process. Conceptions
Conceptions of
of many
many other
other thoughtful
thoughtful international
international lawyers
within aa contemporary
contemporary society
society not
not burdened
burdened by the
the impediments
struggling within
many
to
share
"legalistic-moralistic" assumptions
assumptions have come
come
share many of Kennan's
Kennan's
of "legalistic-moralistic"
lawyers,
international
conclusions. Yet, without fail, these distinguished
distinguished
lawyers, disagreeing
agreeing as they might with
with each other and
and on their assumptions,
assumptions, have
have
human rights
and
fundamental
dignity
of
human
problem
and
rights near
near
placed the problem of human
placed
the top
top of their concerns, along
along with
with the control of
of violence and nuclear
nuclear
weapons, the
the problems
problems of economic
economic development, and the concern about
about
environmental degradation.
degradation.
environmental
It is the task for
for jurisprudence to try to explain where we
we are headed or
or
is rapidly affecting how
It is
is clear that change is
how we
we see,
see, concepought to be. It
tualize, and act. The structures
international order are inadequate
inadequate for the
structures of international
present
present and have not
not yet yielded a future, and
and we
we are skeptical of throwing
throwing
them out. Yet we need
need these institutions, without illusion, without the concealed assumptions that Kennan's realism so long ago revealed and that his
structure now employs with great conceptual difficulty.
own structure
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